Introduction

OpenClaw has changed how teams run AI agents across messaging apps and automation tools. But with great power comes real risk. Recent incidents with malicious skills and exposed ports have made security a top priority for anyone running this self-hosted agent gateway.

This guide covers everything you need to know about OpenClaw security policy configuration. We’ll walk through the architecture, trust boundaries, sandboxing controls, and hardening steps that separate a vulnerable setup from a locked-down one.

You’ll learn how to protect your deployment from prompt injection attacks. We’ll explain the trust boundary matrix and credential storage. We’ll also show you how to audit your current setup in under 60 seconds.

Whether you’re running OpenClaw for personal use or deploying it across a company, this guide gives you the concrete steps to do it safely.

Understanding OpenClaw Architecture and Why Security Matters

What Makes OpenClaw Different From Other AI Tools

OpenClaw isn’t just another chatbot wrapper. It’s a self-hosted AI agent gateway. This means it sits between your messaging channels, your tools, and your AI models.

Think of it as a command center. Messages come in from Slack, WhatsApp, or Discord. OpenClaw processes them, decides what actions to take, and executes those actions using various tools.

Here’s where security gets tricky. OpenClaw has access to:

• Your file system
• Your messaging platforms
• External APIs through ClawHub skills
• System command execution
• Memory and conversation history

That’s a lot of power concentrated in one place. If someone compromises your OpenClaw instance, they could read your files, send messages as you, or run commands on your machine.

The Gateway as a Critical Security Boundary

The OpenClaw Gateway acts as your primary security boundary. Every request flows through it. Every tool execution passes its checks. Every credential gets managed here.

“Running OpenClaw is not just an installation task, but an infrastructure decision,” as one security researcher put it. This captures the mindset you need.

The gateway handles several security functions:

• Authentication for incoming connections
• Authorization for tool usage
• Sandboxing for code execution
• Credential management for API keys
• Logging for audit trails

When you understand that the gateway is your first and last line of defense, you start taking its configuration seriously.

Real Incidents That Shaped Current Security Practices

The OpenClaw community hasn’t learned security lessons in theory. Real incidents drove the current best practices.

Malicious ClawHub skills have been discovered that attempted to exfiltrate user data. These looked like legitimate automation tools but contained hidden code that sent information to external servers.

Exposed default ports allowed attackers to connect to unprotected OpenClaw instances running on public servers. Without authentication configured, anyone could send commands.

Prompt injection attacks tricked AI agents into performing unauthorized actions. A carefully crafted message could override the agent’s instructions and make it do something harmful.

These aren’t hypothetical risks. They’ve happened. The security policies we’ll discuss exist because of these real-world attacks.

The Scope-First Security Model Explained

What “Scope First” Actually Means

OpenClaw uses what it calls a “scope-first personal assistant security model.” This sounds technical, but the idea is simple. Limit what the AI can access to only what it needs.

By default, your OpenClaw agent shouldn’t have access to everything on your system. It should have access to specific files, specific tools, and specific channels.

The principle follows the old security rule: least privilege. Give the minimum access required for the task at hand.

DM Scope Configuration

The dmScope setting controls how OpenClaw handles direct messages. The recommended setting is “per-channel-peer” which isolates conversations.

Here’s what that looks like in configuration:

session: { dmScope: "per-channel-peer" }

This means each conversation with a different person creates its own isolated context. Messages from one user can’t leak into conversations with another user.

Why does this matter? Imagine you’re using OpenClaw for both work and personal tasks. You don’t want your work colleague accidentally seeing context from personal conversations.

Workspace-Only File Access

One of the most dangerous permissions is file system access. An unrestricted agent could read your SSH keys, browser cookies, or password managers.

The workspaceOnly setting limits file operations to a specific folder:

fs: { workspaceOnly: true }

With this enabled, OpenClaw can only read and write files within its designated workspace. Even if an attacker tricks the AI into trying to access sensitive files, the gateway blocks it.

This one setting prevents entire categories of attacks. It’s non-negotiable for secure deployments.

Channel-Specific Policies

Different messaging channels deserve different trust levels. Your private Discord server isn’t the same as a public Slack workspace.

OpenClaw lets you set policies per channel. For example:

channels: { whatsapp: { dmPolicy: "pairing", groups: { "*": { requireMention: true } } } }

The “requireMention” setting means the bot only responds when directly mentioned in group chats. This prevents the AI from getting triggered by random messages that might contain prompt injection attempts.

For high-security channels, you might disable certain tools entirely. For personal channels where you trust all participants, you might allow more permissions.

Trust Boundary Matrix: Who Can Do What

Understanding Trust Boundaries in OpenClaw

A trust boundary is where one level of trust meets another. In OpenClaw, several trust boundaries exist:

• User to Gateway: Are you who you say you are?
• Gateway to Tools: What can the agent actually do?
• Tools to System: What can tools access on the host?
• Skills to Gateway: Can external code be trusted?

Each boundary needs its own controls. A failure at any boundary can compromise the whole system.

The Trust Boundary Matrix Breakdown

OpenClaw documentation provides a trust boundary matrix. Here’s a simplified version:

Notice that external messages have “No Trust” by default. Every message coming in should be treated as potentially hostile.

Gateway and Node Trust Concepts

The Gateway runs on your host machine. It has full access to whatever the host allows. This is why host security matters so much.

Nodes are where tools actually execute. They can be local or remote. The trust relationship between gateway and node needs careful configuration.

For remote nodes, always use encrypted connections. Never send credentials over unencrypted channels. And always verify the identity of nodes before trusting them with sensitive operations.

What Isn’t a Vulnerability By Design

Some behaviors look like security holes but are actually intentional. OpenClaw documentation lists things that “are not vulnerabilities by design.”

For example, if you give an agent file system access, it can read files. That’s not a bug. That’s the permission you granted.

If you don’t configure authentication, anyone can connect. That’s not a vulnerability. That’s a configuration choice.

Understanding this distinction matters. Security comes from proper configuration, not from hoping the software will protect you from yourself.

Tool Security and Sandbox Configuration

The Tool Profile System

OpenClaw organizes tools into profiles. Each profile enables a set of capabilities. The default secure profile is “messaging”:

tools: { profile: "messaging" }

This profile allows basic communication tools but restricts dangerous operations. Other profiles exist for different use cases, but they come with increased risk.

Always start with the most restrictive profile. Only add permissions when you have a specific need.

Deny Lists: Blocking Dangerous Tools

Even within a profile, some tools might be too risky. The deny list explicitly blocks them:

deny: ["group:automation", "group:runtime", "group:fs", "sessions_spawn", "sessions_send"]

Let’s break down what each of these blocks:

• group:automation: Automated task scheduling and execution
• group:runtime: Direct code execution capabilities
• group:fs: File system operations beyond workspace
• sessions_spawn: Creating new agent sessions
• sessions_send: Sending messages as the agent

These groups represent the most dangerous capabilities. Blocking them by default follows the principle of least privilege.

Execution Security: Deny and Ask Settings

The exec configuration controls how OpenClaw handles system commands:

exec: { security: "deny", ask: "always" }

With security set to “deny”, the system blocks command execution by default. With ask set to “always”, any attempt to run a command requires explicit user approval.

This double protection prevents both accidental and malicious command execution. Even if an attacker tricks the AI into trying to run a command, you’ll see the request and can deny it.

Understanding the Sandbox Architecture

OpenClaw uses Docker as its default sandbox backend. This creates isolated environments where tools run without direct access to the host system.

The sandbox provides several protections:

• Network isolation: Tools can’t make arbitrary network connections
• File system isolation: Tools only see files explicitly shared with them
• Process isolation: Tools can’t see or interact with host processes
• Resource limits: Tools can’t consume unlimited CPU or memory

From the documentation: “Tool sandbox (agents.defaults.sandbox, host gateway + sandbox-isolated tools; Docker is the default backend).”

Always run tools in sandboxed environments. The few seconds of overhead are worth the protection.

Elevated Permissions: When and Why

Some operations require elevated permissions. The configuration handles this:

elevated: { enabled: false }

Keeping elevated permissions disabled is the safe default. Enabling them means certain tools can bypass normal restrictions.

Only enable elevated permissions when you understand exactly what tools need them and why. Even then, consider if there’s a safer alternative.

If you must enable elevated permissions, audit your logs regularly. Watch for any unusual tool usage.

Gateway Authentication and Network Security

Binding to Loopback: The First Security Layer

The simplest security measure is also one of the most effective. Bind the gateway to loopback only:

gateway: { mode: "local", bind: "loopback" }

This means the gateway only accepts connections from the same machine. External connections are impossible. Even if someone knows your server’s IP address, they can’t connect directly.

For personal use on a single machine, this is all you need. The gateway is inaccessible from the network.

Token-Based Authentication

When you need remote access, token authentication adds a security layer:

auth: { mode: "token", token: "replace-with-long-random-token" }

The token acts like a password. Anyone connecting must provide it. Without the token, the gateway rejects the connection.

Generate a strong token. Don’t use “password” or “12345”. Use a random string of at least 32 characters. Most systems have tools to generate secure random tokens.

Store the token securely. Don’t commit it to public repositories. Don’t share it in unencrypted channels.

Control UI Over HTTP: Risks and Protections

OpenClaw provides a web-based control interface. This is convenient but risky. The documentation specifically addresses “Control UI over HTTP.”

Never expose the control UI to the public internet without:

• HTTPS encryption (TLS)
• Strong authentication
• Network-level access controls

If someone gains access to the control UI, they can change settings, view conversations, and potentially compromise the entire system.

Reverse Proxy Configuration for Production

For production deployments, put a reverse proxy in front of OpenClaw. The documentation covers “Reverse proxy configuration” for good reason.

A reverse proxy like Nginx or Traefik provides:

• TLS termination: Encrypts traffic between clients and your server
• Rate limiting: Prevents denial-of-service attacks
• Access logs: Records who connected and when
• IP filtering: Blocks connections from suspicious sources

Here’s a basic Nginx configuration pattern:

Set up your proxy to only forward authenticated requests. Add rate limits to prevent brute-force attacks. Enable access logging for security audits.

HSTS and Origin Notes

HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) tells browsers to only use HTTPS. The documentation’s “HSTS and origin notes” section explains the details.

Enable HSTS when running the control UI over the web. This prevents downgrade attacks where someone intercepts your connection and removes encryption.

Origin checking prevents cross-site request forgery. The gateway should reject requests that don’t come from expected origins.

Insecure and Dangerous Flags to Avoid

The documentation lists “Insecure or dangerous flags summary.” These are command-line options that reduce security for convenience.

Examples include:

• Disabling authentication
• Binding to all interfaces
• Allowing unsigned skills
• Disabling the sandbox

Never use these flags in production. They exist for development and testing only. Using them on a public server is asking for trouble.

ClawHub Skills: External Code Risks and Mitigations

What Are ClawHub Skills

ClawHub is like an app store for OpenClaw capabilities. Skills are packages that add new features. They might integrate with external services, add new tools, or extend the AI’s abilities.

But here’s the problem: skills are code that runs on your system. If that code is malicious, it can do anything your OpenClaw process can do.

The Risk of Third-Party Code

Malicious ClawHub skills have been discovered in the wild. They looked legitimate but contained hidden backdoors.

These malicious skills might:

• Exfiltrate your API keys to attackers
• Read and send your private messages
• Install persistent backdoors
• Mine cryptocurrency using your resources
• Join your machine to a botnet

Just because a skill exists on ClawHub doesn’t mean it’s safe. The platform might not catch every malicious submission.

Treating Skill Folders as Trusted Code

From the security guide: “Treat skill folders as trusted code/config (don’t let random people edit them).”

This means:

• Only install skills from sources you trust
• Review skill code before installing when possible
• Keep skill folders with strict file permissions
• Don’t give others write access to skill directories

If you’re technical, look at the code. Check for network requests to unknown servers. Look for obfuscated code sections. Be suspicious of skills that ask for permissions they shouldn’t need.

Dynamic Skills and Watcher Security

The documentation mentions “Dynamic skills (watcher / remote nodes).” This feature auto-loads skills when files change.

While convenient, this creates a security risk. If an attacker can write to your skill folder, they can inject malicious code that auto-loads.

For production:

• Disable dynamic skill loading if you don’t need it
• Use strict file permissions on skill directories
• Monitor skill folders for unexpected changes
• Consider using immutable containers in production

Published Package Dependency Lock

The “Published package dependency lock” feature helps ensure you’re running the exact code versions you expect.

Without dependency locking, a skill might pull in updated dependencies that contain new vulnerabilities or malicious code.

Lock your dependencies in production. Verify checksums when possible. Be cautious of skills that require unlocked or latest dependencies.

Shared Workspace Security Concerns

Shared Slack Workspace: A Real Risk

The documentation explicitly calls out “Shared Slack workspace: real risk.” This deserves attention.

When multiple people share a Slack workspace where OpenClaw operates, any of them might:

• Send messages the AI interprets as commands
• Attempt prompt injection attacks
• Access information meant for other users
• Trigger tool executions they shouldn’t

In a shared workspace, you can’t control what messages the AI sees. Other users might be curious, malicious, or just careless.

Mitigating Shared Workspace Risks

If you must run OpenClaw in a shared workspace:

• Enable requireMention so the bot only responds when directly addressed
• Use per-channel-peer DM scope to isolate conversations
• Restrict which channels the bot monitors
• Disable dangerous tools entirely in shared contexts
• Set up alerting for unusual command patterns

Consider whether you really need the bot in shared channels. Often, it’s safer to use it only in private channels or direct messages.

Company-Shared Agent: An Acceptable Pattern

The documentation describes “Company-shared agent: acceptable pattern.” This is different from an uncontrolled shared workspace.

In an acceptable company-shared pattern:

• A dedicated team manages the agent configuration
• Access is controlled through corporate identity systems
• Permissions are set based on user roles
• Audit logs track who did what
• Policies define acceptable use

The key difference is control. A company-shared agent has defined boundaries, while a random shared workspace is chaos.

The Shared Inbox Quick Rule

The “Shared inbox quick rule” provides simple guidance: if multiple untrusted people can send messages to the same inbox, restrict what the agent can do.

This applies to:

• Customer support inboxes
• Shared team email addresses
• Public-facing chat widgets
• Open Discord servers

For these contexts, disable file system access entirely. Disable command execution. Use read-only tools only. Treat every message as potentially hostile.

Security Auditing Your OpenClaw Setup

The Quick Check: OpenClaw Security Audit

The documentation mentions “Quick check: openclaw security audit.” This is a built-in way to assess your setup’s security posture.

Run the audit command and review the output. It checks for common misconfigurations and highlights risky settings.

Make this part of your regular routine. Run the audit after any configuration change. Run it again periodically even if nothing changed.

Hardened Baseline in 60 Seconds

The “Hardened baseline in 60 seconds” section provides a quick-start configuration. Here’s the complete secure baseline:


gateway: {
  mode: "local",
  bind: "loopback",
  auth: { mode: "token", token: "replace-with-long-random-token" },
},
session: {
  dmScope: "per-channel-peer",
},
tools: {
  profile: "messaging",
  deny: ["group:automation", "group:runtime", "group:fs", "sessions_spawn", "sessions_send"],
  fs: { workspaceOnly: true },
  exec: { security: "deny", ask: "always" },
  elevated: { enabled: false },
},
channels: {
  whatsapp: { dmPolicy: "pairing", groups: { "*": { requireMention: true } } },
},


This configuration:

• Binds to loopback only (no external network access)
• Requires token authentication
• Isolates conversations by channel and peer
• Uses the restrictive messaging profile
• Blocks dangerous tool groups
• Limits file access to workspace
• Denies command execution by default
• Requires approval for any execution attempts
• Disables elevated permissions
• Requires mention in group chats

What the Audit Checks

The security audit examines several areas, as described in “What the audit checks (high level)”:

• Network exposure: Is the gateway accessible from the network?
• Authentication status: Is authentication configured and enabled?
• Tool permissions: What dangerous tools are allowed?
• File system scope: Is file access properly restricted?
• Execution policy: Can commands be run without approval?
• Skill integrity: Are installed skills from trusted sources?
• Credential storage: Are secrets stored securely?

Each check produces a pass, warning, or fail result. Address all failures before running in production.

The Security Audit Checklist

Beyond the automated audit, use this manual checklist:

Security Audit Glossary Terms

The “Security audit glossary” defines terms you’ll encounter. Here are the key ones:

• Trust boundary: Where one level of trust meets another
• Scope: The range of resources something can access
• Sandbox: An isolated environment limiting what code can do
• Elevation: Gaining higher permission levels
• Prompt injection: Tricking AI through crafted inputs
• Exfiltration: Unauthorized data extraction

Understanding these terms helps you communicate about security issues clearly.

Credential Storage and Data Protection

The Credential Storage Map

OpenClaw handles various credentials: API keys, tokens, passwords, and secrets. The “Credential storage map” shows where these live.

Default credential locations include:

• Configuration files
• Environment variables
• Memory during execution
• Session storage

Each location has different security properties. Configuration files persist on disk. Environment variables are visible to child processes. Memory contents might be swapped to disk.

Protecting Stored Credentials

Never store credentials in plain text configuration files that are version controlled. Use environment variables or secret management systems.

For sensitive deployments:

• Use a secrets manager like HashiCorp Vault
• Rotate credentials regularly
• Monitor for credential exposure
• Use short-lived tokens when possible

If credentials do get exposed, assume they’ve been compromised. Rotate immediately.

Local Session Logs on Disk

The documentation notes “Local session logs live on disk.” This has security implications.

Session logs might contain:

• Conversation contents
• Tool execution history
• Partial credentials or sensitive data
• Error messages with internal details

Protect log files with appropriate permissions. Consider encrypting the disk where logs are stored. Set retention policies to delete old logs.

In shared hosting environments, ensure other users can’t read your log files.

Context Visibility Model

The “Context visibility model” explains what information the AI can see during conversations.

Context might include:

• Recent messages in the conversation
• Results from previous tool executions
• Information from connected services
• Memory from past sessions

Be aware of what enters the context. Sensitive information in context might influence AI responses or appear in logs.

For sensitive operations, consider clearing context before and after. Don’t let sensitive data linger in the conversation history.

Deployment Best Practices and Host Security

Deployment and Host Trust

The “Deployment and host trust” section makes a critical point: your OpenClaw instance is only as secure as the machine running it.

If someone compromises your host, they compromise OpenClaw. If your host has other vulnerable services, attackers might pivot through them.

Host security essentials:

• Keep the operating system updated
• Remove unnecessary services
• Use a firewall to limit network access
• Enable disk encryption
• Implement access logging
• Use strong passwords and key-based SSH

Secure File Operations Setup

The “Secure file operations” guidance extends beyond workspaceOnly settings.

Consider:

• What files the workspace contains
• Who has permission to modify workspace files
• Whether symlinks might escape the workspace
• How file uploads are handled

Create a dedicated workspace directory with minimal contents. Don’t put the workspace inside sensitive directories. Monitor the workspace for unexpected files.

Node Execution Security

The “Node execution (system.run)” section covers running system commands. This is where things get dangerous.

Even with deny/ask settings, you should understand:

• What commands might be requested
• Whether those commands are safe to run
• What a command might do if arguments are manipulated

Never blindly approve command execution. Read the full command. Understand what it does. Consider if it’s really necessary.

Production Deployment Patterns

For production, consider these deployment patterns:

Containerized deployment: Run OpenClaw in Docker with strict resource limits. Use read-only file systems where possible. Network isolate the container.

Orchestrated deployment: Use Kubernetes or similar to manage OpenClaw instances. Implement health checks. Use secrets management. Enable pod security policies.

Serverless deployment: Some components can run in serverless environments with natural isolation. But consider cold start latency and execution limits.

Document your deployment architecture. Know where data flows. Understand your attack surface.

Letting AI Help With Security Configuration

The Reddit Approach: Vibe-Coding Security

One Reddit user shared an interesting approach: “vibe-coded my way to a top 1% security OpenClaw setup using claude code.”

This means using an AI assistant to help configure OpenClaw security. You describe what you want, and the AI writes the configuration.

This approach has benefits:

• You don’t need deep security expertise
• The AI can check for common mistakes
• Configuration is faster
• The AI can explain what each setting does

How the Security Practice Guide Works With AI

From the SlowMist security practice guide: “You can send this guide directly to OpenClaw in chat, let it evaluate reliability, and deploy the defense matrix with minimal manual setup.”

The guide continues: “This is exactly how this guide reduces user configuration cost: OpenClaw can understand, deploy, and validate most of the security workflow for you.”

This is a meta-approach. Use the AI to secure the AI. The guide is written so AI agents can understand and implement it.

Verification Steps After AI-Assisted Setup

Don’t blindly trust AI-generated configurations. Always verify:

• Run the security audit after configuration
• Manually review critical settings
• Test that restrictions actually work
• Check logs for unexpected access attempts

AI assistants are helpful but not infallible. They might misunderstand your requirements or make mistakes.

Keeping Security Up to Date

Security isn’t a one-time setup. New threats emerge. OpenClaw updates. Best practices evolve.

Establish a routine:

• Check for OpenClaw updates regularly
• Review security announcements
• Re-run audits after updates
• Test configurations after changes
• Stay engaged with the community

The SlowMist guide notes it’s “based on specific OpenClaw versions (see the Version & Effectiveness Disclaimer).” This means security guidance might not apply to all versions.

Practical Examples and Real-World Scenarios

Scenario: Personal Assistant on Single Machine

You’re running OpenClaw on your laptop for personal tasks. You’re the only user. Security concerns:

• Local network exposure if on shared WiFi
• Access to sensitive files on your machine
• Credential storage in readable files

Configuration approach:

Bind to loopback only. Enable workspaceOnly file access. Disable automation and runtime tool groups. Use the messaging profile.

You probably don’t need token auth if bound to loopback. But it doesn’t hurt to enable it anyway.

Scenario: Team Bot in Private Slack

Your small team wants an AI assistant in a private Slack channel. Everyone trusts everyone. Security concerns:

• Messages visible to all team members
• Tool actions affect shared resources
• Accidental prompt injection from pasted content

Configuration approach:

Use requireMention in the channel. Set per-channel-peer scope. Enable the deny list for dangerous tools. Consider whether file access is really needed.

Document what the bot can do so team members understand the risks of their messages.

Scenario: Customer-Facing Support Bot

You want to use OpenClaw to handle customer support inquiries. Customers are untrusted. Security concerns:

• Customers might try prompt injection
• Sensitive customer data in conversations
• Bot might reveal internal information

Configuration approach:

Maximum lockdown. Deny all tool groups. No file access. No command execution. Read-only information access only.

Put the bot behind additional filtering that checks for prompt injection attempts. Log everything. Alert on suspicious patterns.

Scenario: Development Environment

You’re using OpenClaw to help with coding tasks. It needs file access and maybe command execution. Security concerns:

• Higher permission requirements
• Potential for destructive actions
• Source code exposure

Configuration approach:

Enable file access but keep workspaceOnly true. Set the workspace to your project directory only. Keep exec set to deny with ask: always.

Review every execution request carefully. Use version control so you can recover from mistakes. Consider running in a VM or container for additional isolation.

Conclusion

OpenClaw security isn’t optional. It’s a requirement for responsible deployment. The tools exist to lock down your setup. The documentation explains the risks. And the community shares real-world experiences.

Start with the hardened baseline configuration. Run the security audit. Understand your trust boundaries. Be cautious with external skills.

Security is a process, not a destination. Keep reviewing your configuration. Stay updated on new threats. And remember: the AI agent is only as secure as you configure it to be.

Frequently Asked Questions About OpenClaw Security Policy