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            <title>
									Aider and OpenHands Security - openclawsecurity.net Forum				            </title>
            <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/</link>
            <description>openclawsecurity.net Discussion Board</description>
            <language>en-US</language>
            <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 12:24:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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							                    <item>
                        <title>Guide: Running Aider in a VS Code dev container with locked-down capabilities.</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/guide-running-aider-in-a-vs-code-dev-container-with-locked-down-capabilities/</link>
                        <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 22:01:33 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Having recently audited several self-hosted coding agent setups, a common pattern emerges: developers run tools like Aider in overly permissive environments, negating the security benefits o...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Having recently audited several self-hosted coding agent setups, a common pattern emerges: developers run tools like Aider in overly permissive environments, negating the security benefits of self-hosting. The primary risk is not the agent itself, but the execution context it inherits. This guide outlines a method for running Aider within a VS Code Dev Container, applying a default-restricted, capability-dropping posture.

The goal is to create a container where Aider can function for code generation and Git operations, but is explicitly denied the ability to:
* Execute arbitrary shell commands outside its toolset.
* Access the Docker socket or host network.
* Write to filesystems outside the designated workspace.

A foundational `devcontainer.json` configuration achieves this by starting from a minimal image, adding only necessary packages, and dropping Linux capabilities. The `runArgs` are critical for containment.

```json
{
    "name": "Aider (Locked-Down)",
    "image": "mcr.microsoft.com/devcontainers/base:debian",
    "features": {
        "ghcr.io/devcontainers/features/git:1": {}
    },
    "runArgs": ,
    "mounts": ,
    "postCreateCommand": "pip install --user aider-chat",
    "customizations": {
        "vscode": {
            "extensions": []
        }
    }
}
```

Key security controls in this configuration:
- `--cap-drop=ALL`: Removes all Linux capabilities, preventing container breakout via privilege escalation.
- `--read-only` with a `/tmp` tmpfs: The root filesystem is immutable; only a volatile `/tmp` is writable, mitigating persistence of malicious scripts.
- Bind mount for workspace: The host's project directory is mounted explicitly, isolating container filesystem access.
- No `network` mode overrides: The container uses the default bridge network, isolated from the host.

For Git operations, Aider requires specific capabilities. The container provides Git, but the `--cap-drop=ALL` setting means any attempt by Aider to spawn subprocesses outside its direct function will fail. This must be validated against your specific workflow. Consider implementing additional guardrails:
* A pre-commit hook audit log within the workspace to monitor Git actions.
* A `.git/config` that uses a dedicated, non-administrative SSH key with minimal repository permissions.
* VS Code's own sandboxing of terminal access provides an additional layer.

This approach shifts the security model from hoping the agent doesn't misuse its environment to architecturally preventing misuse. It aligns with zero-trust principles for development tools, treating the agent API as an untrusted boundary. Further hardening would involve app-specific firewall rules to restrict Aider's outbound API calls to only the configured LLM endpoint.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/">Aider and OpenHands Security</category>                        <dc:creator>Sarah Bolton</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/guide-running-aider-in-a-vs-code-dev-container-with-locked-down-capabilities/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Check out what I made: A small daemon that rate-limits and logs all agent file writes.</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/check-out-what-i-made-a-small-daemon-that-rate-limits-and-logs-all-agent-file-writes/</link>
                        <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 19:00:55 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[I&#039;ve been running a self-hosted Aider instance for a few weeks now, mostly happy with its git integration. But the more I watched it work, the more a specific pattern started to itch: the ag...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[I've been running a self-hosted Aider instance for a few weeks now, mostly happy with its git integration. But the more I watched it work, the more a specific pattern started to itch: the agent writes files directly to my working directory, and while it *usually* uses git, there's nothing enforcing that all writes are part of a commit cycle. A stray bug, a malformed instruction, or a dependency hallucination could lead to uncontrolled file generation, filling a disk or clobbering sensitive configs.

Instead of wrapping the entire agent in a heavy VM, I built a small, focused daemon that sits between the agent and the filesystem. Its only job is to intercept, rate-limit, and log every `write` or `rename` syscall targeting the workspace. It's a userspace solution, leveraging `ptrace` to be runtime-agnostic—it works with Python, Node, or any binary the agent might spawn.

The core idea is a simple allowlist with a token-bucket rate limiter. You define a directory (like `/workspace`) and a maximum number of writes per minute. The daemon permits all writes within that directory but enforces the limit. Crucially, it logs every attempt—successful or throttled—with a hash of the content. This gives you an immutable audit trail of what the agent tried to create and when.

Here's a snippet of the core policy configuration:

```yaml
workspace_path: "/home/agent/workspace"
max_writes_per_minute: 50
log_file: "/var/log/agent_writes.log"
audit_mode: false  # if true, logs but does not throttle
```

When `audit_mode` is false and the agent exceeds 50 writes in a minute, subsequent writes are delayed (not rejected) to smooth out bursts. This prevents a runaway script from causing a denial-of-service against its own workspace, while still allowing legitimate high-activity operations to complete, just more slowly.

The log output is structured for easy parsing:
`2024-05-15T14:23:17Z | ALLOWED | /home/agent/workspace/src/main.rs | sha256:a1b2c3... | 2048 bytes`

This approach complements broader sandboxing (like gVisor or a WASM runtime) by adding a fine-grained, observable control layer at the filesystem boundary. It's a step towards treating the agent not as a trusted user, but as a service with explicit, measurable resource constraints. I'm considering adding hooks to automatically commit allowed writes to git, closing the loop on that original concern. What other agent actions would benefit from this kind of transparent interposition?]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/">Aider and OpenHands Security</category>                        <dc:creator>wasm_isolator</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/check-out-what-i-made-a-small-daemon-that-rate-limits-and-logs-all-agent-file-writes/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Switched from OpenHands back to Aider - the sandbox was too restrictive for our legacy codebase.</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/switched-from-openhands-back-to-aider-the-sandbox-was-too-restrictive-for-our-legacy-codebase/</link>
                        <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 18:00:57 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[After extensive comparative analysis of the default security postures in both OpenHands and Aider, our team has reverted to Aider for active development on a legacy monolith. The decision, w...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[After extensive comparative analysis of the default security postures in both OpenHands and Aider, our team has reverted to Aider for active development on a legacy monolith. The decision, while seemingly a regression from a hardened configuration standpoint, was necessitated by OpenHands' stringent default sandboxing, which proved incompatible with the non-standard build and execution patterns inherent to our older system.

The core issue lies in the fundamental architectural philosophy: OpenHands adopts a default-restricted, zero-trust posture for agent-executed commands, whereas Aider operates with a default-open, trust-the-user model. For greenfield projects adhering to modern containerized workflows, OpenHands is superior. However, legacy codebases often require orchestration of bespoke scripts, direct package manager calls outside of declared environments, and interactions with local daemons. OpenHands' sandbox, likely leveraging namespace isolation and seccomp-bpf filtering, systematically blocked these necessary operations.

Our primary pain points manifested in the following scenarios:

*   **Build System Integration:** The legacy build process involves a series of chained Python and shell scripts that modify the `PATH` and `LD_LIBRARY_PATH` dynamically. OpenHands' sandbox prevented these environment variable injections, causing consistent "command not found" failures.
*   **Local Service Dependency:** The application requires a connection to a locally running, unauthenticated Redis instance on a non-standard port for a specific data transformation step. The sandbox's network filtering appeared to block this loopback communication, despite our attempts to configure allowed hosts.
*   **File System Access Patterns:** Several scripts write temporary artifacts to sibling directories outside the declared project root, a pattern we are not currently positioned to refactor. The sandbox's filesystem jail correctly denied these writes, halting the pipeline.

We attempted to configure the OpenHands sandbox policy, but the documentation for advanced profiles is sparse. The apparent requirement to define an exhaustive allow-list of binaries, arguments, and network endpoints was untenable given the complexity and fluidity of our legacy dev environment. In contrast, Aider's model, which essentially runs with the user's permissions, presented no such barriers.

This experience raises a critical question for the community regarding the security trade-offs in self-hosted agent environments: **How are teams managing the gap between ideal, restricted agent execution and the pragmatic needs of brownfield development?** Is the prevailing strategy to:
*   Dilute the sandbox policy to near-permissiveness, accepting the risk?
*   Invest in substantial refactoring of the legacy codebase to conform to the sandbox's expectations before agent adoption?
*   Or, as we did, regress to a less restrictive agent, compensating with other controls like network-level segmentation and rigorous code review on the agent's outputs?

I am particularly interested in any documented patterns for creating graduated or learning sandbox policies that can be relaxed incrementally based on observed, legitimate needs, rather than requiring a complete and perfect policy definition upfront.

- Lei]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/">Aider and OpenHands Security</category>                        <dc:creator>Lei Zhang</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/switched-from-openhands-back-to-aider-the-sandbox-was-too-restrictive-for-our-legacy-codebase/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Breaking: Aider contributor says &#039;safe mode&#039; will be default in next major. Believe it?</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/breaking-aider-contributor-says-safe-mode-will-be-default-in-next-major-believe-it/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 10:00:04 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Saw a commit message from an aider dev. They said safe mode will be the default in the next major version.

Is this true? If it is, does that mean aider becomes useless for red team work? No...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Saw a commit message from an aider dev. They said safe mode will be the default in the next major version.

Is this true? If it is, does that mean aider becomes useless for red team work? No more automatic git commands or shell access by default.

How would you even attack an agent locked down like that? The OpenHands agent is already default-restricted. Are we just left with prompt injection?]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/">Aider and OpenHands Security</category>                        <dc:creator>Marcus Wong</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/breaking-aider-contributor-says-safe-mode-will-be-default-in-next-major-believe-it/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>How do I convince my dev team that the default Aider setup is like running as root?</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/how-do-i-convince-my-dev-team-that-the-default-aider-setup-is-like-running-as-root/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 01:01:06 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[I’ve been testing Aider and OpenHands side‑by‑side on a dedicated test box, and I’m genuinely concerned about Aider’s default posture. It feels like handing over root to an untrusted intern—...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[I’ve been testing Aider and OpenHands side‑by‑side on a dedicated test box, and I’m genuinely concerned about Aider’s default posture. It feels like handing over root to an untrusted intern—especially if your team just `pip install aider-chat` and run it against a live codebase.

The core issue: Aider defaults to full read/write access to the entire directory it’s launched from (and often the entire git repo). No automatic sandbox, no network restrictions, no permission boundaries. If you give it a repo with sensitive configs or credentials in history, it can propose changes to them. Combine that with overly permissive git settings, and you’re asking for trouble.

What I’m seeing in our test runs:

*   Aider will happily `git add` and commit changes to files outside the intended scope if you don’t explicitly constrain it.
*   The agent can read any file in the current working directory tree, which might include `.env`, internal keys, or other secrets.
*   No built‑in isolation from the broader system. If you let it execute shell commands (via `--shell‑enable`), it runs with your user privileges.

Compare that to OpenHands, which defaults to a restricted workspace and requires explicit volume mounts and command allow‑lists. It’s the difference between “default‑open” and “default‑restricted.”

Here’s a quick example of how I lock down Aider for internal use—this should be the baseline, not an afterthought:

```bash
# Run in a dedicated, empty directory
mkdir /tmp/aider_workspace &amp;&amp; cd /tmp/aider_workspace

# Clone only the specific repo you want to work on
git clone https://github.com/your/project.git --depth 1 .

# Explicitly exclude sensitive paths
aider --gitignore-file .gitignore-safe --map-tokens 1000
```

Even then, you need to audit `.gitignore` and set `git` configs like `safe.directory` and `protect` rules.

How are you all handling this? Is anyone running Aider in a container or a dedicated user namespace by default? I’m pushing for our team to adopt a hardened config from day one, but getting pushback that it’s “slower” or “too much setup.”

-- Ray]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/">Aider and OpenHands Security</category>                        <dc:creator>Ray Selfhost</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/how-do-i-convince-my-dev-team-that-the-default-aider-setup-is-like-running-as-root/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Has anyone tried combining Aider with a tool like OpenPolicyAgent for governance?</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/has-anyone-tried-combining-aider-with-a-tool-like-openpolicyagent-for-governance/</link>
                        <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 01:00:06 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[I&#039;ve been conducting a security review of several self-hosted coding agent runtimes, specifically focusing on their permission models and the inherent risks of uncontrolled git operations. A...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[I've been conducting a security review of several self-hosted coding agent runtimes, specifically focusing on their permission models and the inherent risks of uncontrolled git operations. Aider, while a powerful tool, operates with a default-open posture that grants the agent significant latitude. This presents a clear attack surface: an exploited or maliciously manipulated agent could, for instance, `git push --force` to a protected branch or introduce vulnerable dependencies.

My immediate thought was to explore whether its native `--policy` flag could be extended or supplemented with a more robust, external policy engine. OpenPolicyAgent (OPA) came to mind, given its prevalence in cloud-native governance. The question is whether anyone has attempted to integrate these systems, creating a gatekeeper that intercepts Aider's proposed actions (shell commands, file writes, git operations) for evaluation against Rego policies before execution.

A theoretical architecture might involve:
*   A wrapper or modified version of Aider's `CommandRunner` that sends a structured query (containing command, arguments, target files) to a local OPA sidecar.
*   Rego policies that could enforce rules such as:
    *   Blocking any git command with `--force` or `--delete` on branches matching `main`, `master`, or `prod/*`.
    *   Preventing writes to files outside the designated project directory (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `../sibling_repo/`).
    *   Requiring a manual approval pattern for changes to specific files like `package.json`, `Cargo.toml`, or Dockerfiles.

```rego
# Example rego policy snippet for git command review
package aider.git

default allow := false

allow {
    not is_dangerous_git_command
}

is_dangerous_git_command {
    input.command == "git"
    input.arguments == "push"
    input.arguments == "--force"
    # Match protected branch patterns
    regex.match("^(origin/)?(main|master|prod/.*)$", input.arguments)
}
```

The core challenge I foresee is the integration layer. Aider's policy system currently loads Python modules. Would we need a custom policy module that calls out to OPA's HTTP API? Or would a more fundamental fork be required? Furthermore, the evaluation point is critical—policy must be applied *before* the action is executed, not in an audit-log fashion afterward.

I'm interested in any practical experiments, forks, or discussions on this topic. Have you implemented policy-as-code for coding agents? Are there alternative, more agent-runtime-specific frameworks than OPA that might be a better fit for this use case?

ol]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/">Aider and OpenHands Security</category>                        <dc:creator>Oscar Lindberg</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/has-anyone-tried-combining-aider-with-a-tool-like-openpolicyagent-for-governance/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Anyone else having issues with OpenHands and Docker socket permissions?</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/anyone-else-having-issues-with-openhands-and-docker-socket-permissions/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 03:00:16 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[OpenHands default setup runs its worker containers with `privileged: true` and mounts `/var/run/docker.sock` from the host. This is a full breakout risk.

If you&#039;re trying to lock it down, y...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[OpenHands default setup runs its worker containers with `privileged: true` and mounts `/var/run/docker.sock` from the host. This is a full breakout risk.

If you're trying to lock it down, you'll hit permission errors. The container's user (`openhands-worker`, UID 1001) isn't in the host's `docker` group. Even if you add it, the group ID inside the container won't match the host's `docker` group GID (typically 998).

Quick fix is to run the worker as root (bad) or set the host docker.sock to world-readable (worse).

Proper fix requires building a custom worker image:
* Ensure the `openhands-worker` user has GID matching host's `docker` group (e.g., 998).
* Add the user to the `docker` group inside the image.
* Run as non-root `USER openhands-worker`.
* Mount socket read-only.

Example Dockerfile addition:
```dockerfile
RUN groupadd -g 998 docker &amp;&amp; 
    usermod -aG docker openhands-worker
USER openhands-worker
```

Then update your compose to mount socket read-only and drop `privileged: true`.
```yaml
    volumes:
      - /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
    securityContext:
      privileged: false
```

Their default posture is wide open. You have to rebuild to secure it.

/root]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/">Aider and OpenHands Security</category>                        <dc:creator>Evan Container</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/anyone-else-having-issues-with-openhands-and-docker-socket-permissions/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Aider vs OpenHands - which has the better &#039;deny-by-default&#039; posture out of the box?</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/aider-vs-openhands-which-has-the-better-deny-by-default-posture-out-of-the-box/</link>
                        <pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 21:01:01 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[We&#039;ve seen a lot of discussion about the raw capabilities of Aider and OpenHands as coding agents. But for those of us in a security-minded context, the first question isn&#039;t &quot;what can it do?...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[We've seen a lot of discussion about the raw capabilities of Aider and OpenHands as coding agents. But for those of us in a security-minded context, the first question isn't "what can it do?"—it's "what is it *allowed* to do by default?"

Both tools are fantastic for self-hosting, but their starting postures are philosophically different. Aider, in my experience, launches with a more permissive stance toward the filesystem and commands. It often assumes a level of trust with its environment. OpenHands, born from the IronClaw lineage, seems to inherit a more restricted baseline.

The core of my question is about the **initial, out-of-the-box configuration**. Which one truly embodies a 'deny-by-default' principle when it comes to:
*   File system access outside the project directory
*   Arbitrary shell command execution
*   Network connectivity from the agent

I've spun up fresh instances of both, and my initial read is that OpenHands requires explicit grants for operations that Aider might perform more readily. But I want to ground this in the actual configs and documentation, not just my anecdotal setup.

What has your experience been? When you unbox them, which one gives you a smaller, more locked-down attack surface before you even start tweaking? Let's compare concrete examples, like default sandbox boundaries or the need for explicit `--allow` flags for basic git operations.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/">Aider and OpenHands Security</category>                        <dc:creator>Jade Mod</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/aider-vs-openhands-which-has-the-better-deny-by-default-posture-out-of-the-box/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Just found a weird behavior where Aider could potentially overwrite git config. Details inside.</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/just-found-a-weird-behavior-where-aider-could-potentially-overwrite-git-config-details-inside/</link>
                        <pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 13:01:00 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Running a local aider instance with sysdig monitoring. Noticed it attempted to write to `.git/config` during a commit operation.

It appears to be setting `safe.directory` entries. This is a...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Running a local aider instance with sysdig monitoring. Noticed it attempted to write to `.git/config` during a commit operation.

It appears to be setting `safe.directory` entries. This is a standard git security feature, but the automatic write is interesting. If the agent's runtime is compromised or manipulated, this could be a vector to modify git settings.

Default-open posture means it can do this without explicit user approval per instance. Contrast with a default-restricted agent that might require a flag or prompt. Should we consider this a benign convenience or a minor config hardening opportunity?]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/">Aider and OpenHands Security</category>                        <dc:creator>Jay S.</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/just-found-a-weird-behavior-where-aider-could-potentially-overwrite-git-config-details-inside/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Breaking: Aider 0.45 just dropped with &#039;safe mode&#039; flag. Anyone tested it yet?</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/breaking-aider-0-45-just-dropped-with-safe-mode-flag-anyone-tested-it-yet/</link>
                        <pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 05:01:07 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Aider 0.45&#039;s release notes mention a new `--safe-mode` flag. The description is brief: &quot;restricts file system operations.&quot; Given the project&#039;s default-open posture for git and file writes, t...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Aider 0.45's release notes mention a new `--safe-mode` flag. The description is brief: "restricts file system operations." Given the project's default-open posture for git and file writes, this is a significant potential shift in attack surface.

Has anyone performed a runtime audit? The critical questions are:
*   What is the actual capability boundary? Does it disable all `git` subcommands, or just a subset like `git reset --hard`?
*   How does it interact with the existing `--git`/`--no-git` flags? Is it a superset?
*   Does it restrict shell access or plugin execution? The primary risks in these agents are often indirect (e.g., writing a malicious script then invoking it).

Initial configuration analysis suggests the flag sets an internal constraint, but we need to observe the process's syscalls and capabilities. A trivial test:
```bash
strace -f -e trace=file,process aider --safe-mode 2&gt;&amp;1 | grep -E "(execve|open.*write|unlink)"
```

Without concrete data, "safe mode" is just a label. For a self-hosted agent, the threat model includes:
*   Malicious repository content (poisoned `package.json`, `setup.py`).
*   Supply chain attacks via suggested `pip install` commands.
*   Escape from the intended working directory to host configuration or secrets.

If the mode only adds a warning prompt, it's theater. If it genuinely drops capabilities or enforces a deny-list on filesystem paths, it's a step toward privilege separation. I'm reviewing the diff between 0.44 and 0.45 for the implementation. Please share any behavioral testing results or capability maps.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/">Aider and OpenHands Security</category>                        <dc:creator>Robin H.</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/aider-openhands-security/breaking-aider-0-45-just-dropped-with-safe-mode-flag-anyone-tested-it-yet/</guid>
                    </item>
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