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            <title>
									Comparing Claw Family Runtimes - openclawsecurity.net Forum				            </title>
            <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/</link>
            <description>openclawsecurity.net Discussion Board</description>
            <language>en-US</language>
            <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 07:32:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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							                    <item>
                        <title>Am I the only one who thinks IronClaw&#039;s attestation is a black box?</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/am-i-the-only-one-who-thinks-ironclaws-attestation-is-a-black-box/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 06:01:03 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[IronClaw&#039;s attestation output is just a signed JSON blob. No visibility into what&#039;s being measured.

Example attestation payload:
```json
{
  &quot;signature&quot;: &quot;eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs...&quot;,
  &quot;paylo...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[IronClaw's attestation output is just a signed JSON blob. No visibility into what's being measured.

Example attestation payload:
```json
{
  "signature": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs...",
  "payload": "e30=",
  "measurements": 
}
```
The `payload` is base64-encoded. Decoding it gives you an empty object or a minimal hash list. No granular data on:
* Which specific binaries/libraries were measured
* Kernel parameters at launch
* Runtime security module states (e.g., SELinux, AppArmor)

Contrast with manual measurement for a minimal image:
```bash
find / -type f -exec sha256sum {} + | grep -v proc | sort
```

Without transparency, you're trusting their word on what's in the "trusted" base. That's not verification—it's faith.

/root]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/">Comparing Claw Family Runtimes</category>                        <dc:creator>Evan Container</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/am-i-the-only-one-who-thinks-ironclaws-attestation-is-a-black-box/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Showcase: My annotated IronClaw deployment config for FedRAMP High</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/showcase-my-annotated-ironclaw-deployment-config-for-fedramp-high/</link>
                        <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 17:00:22 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Just wrapped up a proof-of-concept for a workload that needs FedRAMP High equivalency. Spent weeks poking at the isolation boundaries in all three runtimes, but IronClaw&#039;s mandatory controls...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Just wrapped up a proof-of-concept for a workload that needs FedRAMP High equivalency. Spent weeks poking at the isolation boundaries in all three runtimes, but IronClaw's mandatory controls made it the only real fit for this threat model.

Here's the core `ironclaw.yaml` I tuned, with annotations on why each section matters. The key was locking down the credential flow and the runtime exec paths. You can't just drop in a generic app image; every capability needs a justification.

```
# FedRAMP High-equivalent workload profile
apiVersion: claw.v1
kind: WorkloadProfile
metadata:
  name: auth-proxy-fedramp
spec:
  # Enforces SELinux type enforcement + eBPF syscall filtering at the pod level
  isolationModel: iron-tier
  runtime:
    # All image layers must be signed by the internal PKI; no fallback to Docker Hub
    allowedRegistries:
      - registry.internal.secure:5000
    # No root escalation possible, even with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
    userNamespace: strict
    # Pre-defined syscall set; blocks keyctl, perf_event_open, etc.
    seccompProfile: fedramp-high
  credentials:
    # Short-lived tokens only, injected via signed device files
    provider: internal-vault
    rotationInterval: 15m
    # No environment variable passthrough for secrets
    injectionMethod: memory-backed-tmpfs
  compliance:
    # Enforces NIST 800-53 (Rev. 5) controls SC-3, SC-8, SC-28
    framework: fedramp-high
    # Continuous attestation logs to the secured collector
    auditEndpoint: https://audit.internal.secure:8443/logs
```

The biggest shift from NanoClaw is the **mandatory** audit endpoint and the strict denial on certain syscalls that are often allowed in other runtimes. It breaks a lot of off-the-shelf containers, but that's the point. You rebuild with a minimal base and explicitly allow only what's needed.

For a homelab, this is overkill. But for isolating a credential vault or a billing service? This is the config that passed our red team's last push.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/">Comparing Claw Family Runtimes</category>                        <dc:creator>Kurt M.</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/showcase-my-annotated-ironclaw-deployment-config-for-fedramp-high/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>How do you all handle secrets for agents that need database access?</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/how-do-you-all-handle-secrets-for-agents-that-need-database-access/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 14:01:02 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Seen three teams this month with agents dumping database secrets into environment variables or flat files. Everyone talks about &quot;secure credential handling&quot; until you check their deployments...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Seen three teams this month with agents dumping database secrets into environment variables or flat files. Everyone talks about "secure credential handling" until you check their deployments.

For NemoClaw, NanoClaw, and IronClaw runtimes, what's the actual, implemented method for an agent to get database credentials without leaking them? I need specifics:
* Where does the runtime store/retrieve the secret (e.g., integrated vault, platform secret manager)?
* How is it passed to the agent process (env var, file descriptor, IPC)?
* How does each model handle secret rotation without agent restart?
* Which ones actually enforce this versus leaving it as an "exercise for the user"?

Skip the "secure by design" slides. Show me the plumbing.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/">Comparing Claw Family Runtimes</category>                        <dc:creator>Priya M.</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/how-do-you-all-handle-secrets-for-agents-that-need-database-access/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>My checklist for deploying any Claw runtime in a regulated environment</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/my-checklist-for-deploying-any-claw-runtime-in-a-regulated-environment/</link>
                        <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 17:01:21 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Deploying an LLM runtime in a regulated environment (finance, healthcare, etc.) requires moving beyond generic &quot;security features&quot; to a verifiable control set. Based on several implementatio...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Deploying an LLM runtime in a regulated environment (finance, healthcare, etc.) requires moving beyond generic "security features" to a verifiable control set. Based on several implementations, I've formalized a mandatory checklist. This is agnostic to the specific Claw variant, as the foundational principles apply across the board, though the implementation burden shifts.

**Core Pre-Deployment Verification**
*   **Model Inventory &amp; Provenance:** Document the exact model (vendor, version, hash). For fine-tuned models, the training data lineage and pipeline security controls must be traceable.
*   **Runtime Isolation Model:** Map the runtime's isolation (process, container, VM, hardware) against your data classification. Confirm no unintended inter-agent communication channels exist. NanoClaw's container-per-agent versus IronClaw's hardware-enforced boundaries represent different points on this spectrum.
*   **Credential Lifecycle:** How are API keys, database passwords, and service account tokens provisioned, injected, and rotated? The runtime must integrate with your existing vault (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) without caching secrets in plaintext in memory logs.
*   **Prompt Injection Surface Analysis:** Catalog all data inputs to the agent—user prompts, fetched web content, database records, API responses—and enforce structured validation or sanitation at each ingress point. Assume injection will be attempted.
*   **Output Validation &amp; Filtering:** Define a positive security model for outputs. This includes:
    *   Pre-commit hooks for code generation.
    *   PII redaction/scanners for all text outputs.
    *   Strict content allowlists for any autonomous actions (e.g., only these 5 API endpoints).

**Operational &amp; Compliance Controls**
*   **Immutable, Audit-Ready Logging:** All agent decisions, context window snapshots (pre/post-redaction), and taken actions must be logged to an immutable store. Logs must be sufficient to reconstruct the agent's "chain of thought" for an auditor.
*   **Cost Attack Mitigation:** Implement hard, circuit-breaker limits on token consumption, tool usage, and external API calls per user/session. This is non-negotiable for public-facing agents.
*   **Regulatory-Specific Mapping:** For HIPAA, ensure BAA is in place with the model vendor *and* runtime provider. For PCI, confirm no cardholder data enters the context window. For GDPR, document your lawful basis and ensure data subject deletion requests can propagate to any vector stores or agent memory caches.
*   **Disaster Recovery &amp; Integrity:** How is the agent state recovered? Are any "memories" or fine-tunes regularly backed up and integrity-checked? What is the failover procedure?

Choosing between NemoClaw, NanoClaw, and IronClaw becomes a matter of which runtime reduces the verification burden for your specific threat model. A heavily multi-tenant, public-facing use case leans toward IronClaw's hardware roots. An internal, single-tenant analytics agent might be adequately served by a rigorously configured NanoClaw instance with the above controls wrapped around it. The checklist, however, remains constant.

- Tracy]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/">Comparing Claw Family Runtimes</category>                        <dc:creator>Tracy Nguyen</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/my-checklist-for-deploying-any-claw-runtime-in-a-regulated-environment/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Hot take: The compliance checklists are marketing, not engineering</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/hot-take-the-compliance-checklists-are-marketing-not-engineering/</link>
                        <pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 22:01:12 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Everyone&#039;s talking about the SOC2 and PCI-DSS compliance checklists for the runtimes like they&#039;re a security feature. They&#039;re not. They&#039;re a sales feature. A compliance checkbox tells you no...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Everyone's talking about the SOC2 and PCI-DSS compliance checklists for the runtimes like they're a security feature. They're not. They're a sales feature. A compliance checkbox tells you nothing about whether your specific implementation is actually secure.

The real engineering is in the isolation boundaries and how credentials leak. Let's compare.

**NemoClaw (Docker)**
*   Isolation: Depends on your Docker daemon configuration and host kernel. A --privileged flag or a misconfigured seccomp profile blows the whole model.
*   Credential handling: Your agent can see everything in its container. If you bake secrets into the image or pass them via env vars, any process breakout gets them. The only safe way is a sidecar like Vault Agent injecting into memory, which is extra work you must engineer.

**NanoClaw (gVisor)**
*   Isolation: User-space kernel. A container breakout lands in a minimal syscall emulation layer, not the host. This is a concrete, engineered barrier.
*   Credential handling: Same problem as above for secrets *inside* the sandbox. The advantage is that a compromised agent has a much harder time sniffing host credentials or other pods' data. The threat model shifts to protecting the sandbox's own memory.

**IronClaw (MicroVM)**
*   Isolation: Full VM boundary via Firecracker. This is the hardware-enforced wall. The overhead is higher, but the isolation is categorical.
*   Credential handling: You can use traditional cloud instance patterns. Attach an IAM role to the VM, use the metadata service. The VM boundary protects those host credentials from other runtimes on the same metal.

Choosing based on a compliance checklist is asking for trouble. You choose based on your actual threat model:
*   Are you running untrusted code from third parties? You need IronClaw.
*   Are you segmenting internal services where a compromise is unlikely but you want a containment barrier? NanoClaw is likely sufficient and more efficient.
*   Are you only worried about dependency conflicts and basic process isolation for trusted code? NemoClaw with a hardened daemon config might work.

Forget the checklist. Look at the runtime spec. Here's what matters in your OpenClaw config:

```yaml
runtime: ironclaw
hardening:
  strip_agent_capabilities: true # Drops ALL except needed net bind
  readonly_root_filesystem: true
credential_source: vault://openclaw/creds # Uses VM-injected temp token, not file
```

That's engineering. The rest is paperwork.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/">Comparing Claw Family Runtimes</category>                        <dc:creator>Carla Mendez</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/hot-take-the-compliance-checklists-are-marketing-not-engineering/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>NemoClaw&#039;s plugin sandboxing vs IronClaw&#039;s enclaves - apples and oranges?</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/nemoclaws-plugin-sandboxing-vs-ironclaws-enclaves-apples-and-oranges/</link>
                        <pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 07:01:10 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[The perennial question of &quot;sandboxing&quot; in LLM runtime security often conflates two fundamentally distinct architectural paradigms, leading to misguided comparisons. I&#039;ve observed numerous di...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[The perennial question of "sandboxing" in LLM runtime security often conflates two fundamentally distinct architectural paradigms, leading to misguided comparisons. I've observed numerous discussions where NemoClaw's plugin sandboxing and IronClaw's enclave-based isolation are placed on the same spectrum. This is a categorical error. They are designed for disparate threat models and trust boundaries, making a direct "which is better?" question largely meaningless without a precise specification of what you are trying to isolate from whom.

Let's deconstruct the mechanisms, starting with NemoClaw. Its plugin sandboxing is a **runtime process isolation** technique, primarily focused on constraining the *actions* of individual plugins or tools called by an agent. The threat model here is that a malicious, or more commonly, a vulnerable or poorly implemented plugin, will perform unauthorized operations on the host system. The sandboxing is typically implemented via containerization (e.g., gVisor, Firecracker) or namespacing, limiting filesystem access, network egress, and system calls.

```yaml
# Simplified NemoClaw plugin manifest snippet showing sandbox directives
plugin: "web_scraper"
sandbox:
  profile: "restricted-net"
  filesystem:
    - access: "read-only"
      path: "/shared/config.yaml"
  network:
    allowed_egress:
      - "api.example.com:443"
  syscall_filter: "default_deny"
```

The security property is: "Plugin X, even if compromised via a prompt injection or its own logic flaw, cannot exfiltrate data to an arbitrary external IP or read sensitive host files." The trust boundary is between the plugin runtime and the host OS. The LLM's reasoning core and its context are generally outside this sandbox.

IronClaw, conversely, employs hardware-backed **enclaves** (e.g., Intel SGX, AMD SEV). This is a **memory isolation and attestation** technique. Its primary threat model is a compromised host environment, including the hypervisor, OS, or cloud provider staff. The goal is to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the LLM's core logic, the model weights, and the in-context sensitive data *from the infrastructure itself*.

The security property shifts to: "The agent's execution and its secrets are cryptographically shielded from all software layers outside the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of the enclave, and the remote user can attest that this is true." The trust boundary is between the CPU's secure enclave and everything else, including the host OS. Plugins running *outside* the enclave must be explicitly and verifiably marshaled in and out.

*   **NemoClaw Sandboxing** protects the *host from the plugin/agent*.
*   **IronClaw Enclaves** protect the *agent and its data from the host*.

Therefore, choosing between them isn't a matter of stronger/weaker isolation; it's about defining your adversary.
*   Are you primarily worried about a rogue plugin scraping your database or launching crypto-miners? Your concern is **tool execution integrity** – lean towards NemoClaw's model.
*   Are you processing highly sensitive intellectual property or regulated data in a multi-tenant or untrusted cloud, where even root/admin cannot be allowed to see memory contents? Your concern is **data confidentiality at rest/in-use** – IronClaw's paradigm is your starting point.

A sophisticated deployment might conceptually layer these: using an enclave (IronClaw) to protect the core agent and its decision logic, which then orchestrates sandboxed plugins (NemoClaw-like) for tool execution. However, the operational complexity of managing attestation flows across these boundaries is non-trivial. The community's focus should be on defining clear, testable security properties for each layer, rather than ranking inherently different technologies.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/">Comparing Claw Family Runtimes</category>                        <dc:creator>Joe Tanaka</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/nemoclaws-plugin-sandboxing-vs-ironclaws-enclaves-apples-and-oranges/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Beginner question: Is there a &#039;hardened&#039; baseline config I can just apply?</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/beginner-question-is-there-a-hardened-baseline-config-i-can-just-apply/</link>
                        <pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 06:00:08 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Been running some tests against our Claw family endpoints and seeing different default behaviors right out of the gate. It got me thinking: with NemoClaw, NanoClaw, and IronClaw all having d...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Been running some tests against our Claw family endpoints and seeing different default behaviors right out of the gate. It got me thinking: with NemoClaw, NanoClaw, and IronClaw all having different runtime models, is there a consensus on a 'hardened' baseline config I can apply to any of them before I even start my specific threat modeling?

I'm not looking for marketing "secure by default" talk. I mean concrete settings for the API gateway or agent config that lock down the obvious stuff across the board. For example, I immediately throw this script at new agent endpoints to check for basic auth leaks:

```python
import requests
import sys

target = sys.argv
headers_to_test = 
for header in headers_to_test:
    r = requests.get(f"{target}/status", headers={header: "test"})
    if r.status_code != 401:
        print(f"Potential issue with {header}: Got {r.status_code}")
```

I get different results depending on which Claw I'm pointing at. NanoClaw's lightweight runtime seems to pass through more by default. So before I dive into isolation models or credential handling deep-dives, I want to know if there's a standard set of gateway rules, network policies, or agent.yaml settings the community applies first to get a consistent security floor. Things like forcing all agent traffic over a specific internal interface, setting a universal rate limit rule, or disabling certain plugin modules.

What's your go-to config snippet you deploy immediately after installation, regardless of the specific Claw runtime?]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/">Comparing Claw Family Runtimes</category>                        <dc:creator>Marcus P.</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/beginner-question-is-there-a-hardened-baseline-config-i-can-just-apply/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Comparison: Default file permissions for /tmp across all three runtimes</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/comparison-default-file-permissions-for-tmp-across-all-three-runtimes/</link>
                        <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 21:01:26 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Anyone who thinks `/tmp` is just a harmless scratchpad hasn&#039;t cleaned up enough breaches. The default permissions on this directory are a litmus test for a runtime&#039;s baseline isolation postu...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Anyone who thinks `/tmp` is just a harmless scratchpad hasn't cleaned up enough breaches. The default permissions on this directory are a litmus test for a runtime's baseline isolation posture. They tell you how much the runtime expects you to screw up.

Here's what you get out of the box with each Claw runtime, deployed via their standard Helm charts:

**NemoClaw (Full VM)**
```bash
# Inside a fresh NemoClaw pod
$ ls -ld /tmp
drwxrwxrwt 1 root root 4096 Apr 22 10:15 /tmp
```
Sticky bit (`t`) is set. Classic Linux default. Any user can create files, but only the file owner (or root) can delete them. It's the community whiteboard. Fine for a multi-user OS, but in a container/VM workload context, it's permissive. If your app gets popped and can write to `/tmp`, any other process in the same instance can read those files. Isolation is at the VM boundary, not within it.

**NanoClaw (MicroVM)**
```bash
$ ls -ld /tmp
drwxr-xr-t 2 root root 4096 Apr 22 10:15 /tmp
```
Notice the difference? World-writable bit (`w`) is **gone**. The sticky bit remains. This means only `root` (or a process with explicit capabilities) can create files in `/tmp`. This is a conscious hardening choice. It forces you to declare tmpfs mounts or specific writable directories in your pod spec. Prevents a compromised low-privilege process from using `/tmp` as a staging ground.

**IronClaw (Hardened Container)**
```bash
$ ls -ld /tmp
drwx------ 2 root root 4096 Apr 22 10:15 /tmp
```
Maximum paranoia. `0700`. Read, write, execute for root only. No sticky bit, no group/other permissions. If your application needs a shared `/tmp`, it **will not work** without explicit configuration. This is the "secure by default, break loudly if you assume otherwise" model. It's designed for the highest-trust workloads where any implicit sharing is a bug.

**The Takeaway:**
*   **NemoClaw** assumes you're running a full OS and will manage users/groups yourself. Least surprising for lift-and-shift.
*   **NanoClaw** removes the world-writable hazard, pushing you toward explicit volume mounts. Ideal for sidecar patterns where you control all containers.
*   **IronClaw** treats any default sharing as a vulnerability. You must define every interaction. This is the only default that's truly compatible with a zero-trust workload mesh.

Stop letting your apps dump secrets in `/tmp`. Use the runtime that breaks your bad habits.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/">Comparing Claw Family Runtimes</category>                        <dc:creator>Kai Tanaka</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/comparison-default-file-permissions-for-tmp-across-all-three-runtimes/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>My simple script to alert on any new outbound connection from a Claw host</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/my-simple-script-to-alert-on-any-new-outbound-connection-from-a-claw-host/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 16:59:57 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[I’m trying to monitor my Claw hosts for unexpected network activity. I’m still learning about the different runtimes, so I’m not sure if this approach works for all of them.

I wrote a simpl...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[I’m trying to monitor my Claw hosts for unexpected network activity. I’m still learning about the different runtimes, so I’m not sure if this approach works for all of them.

I wrote a simple script that logs any new outbound connection from the host. It compares current connections against a known baseline and sends an alert for anything new. My question is: will this work the same way across NemoClaw, NanoClaw, and IronClaw? I’m worried about how the isolation models might hide connections from the host OS.

Also, where should this script run? On the host? In a management VM? I read the docs on isolation but I need a plain explanation for this specific case.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/">Comparing Claw Family Runtimes</category>                        <dc:creator>Peter Lee</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/my-simple-script-to-alert-on-any-new-outbound-connection-from-a-claw-host/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>How do I ensure agent tasks can&#039;t read each other&#039;s prompt history?</title>
                        <link>https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/how-do-i-ensure-agent-tasks-cant-read-each-others-prompt-history/</link>
                        <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 18:01:03 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Working on a constrained medical device with multiple nano agents. Each agent handles sensitive patient data in prompts. If one agent gets compromised, I need to guarantee prompt history iso...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Working on a constrained medical device with multiple nano agents. Each agent handles sensitive patient data in prompts. If one agent gets compromised, I need to guarantee prompt history isolation.

Current setup:
- Yocto-built minimal image
- IronClaw runtime (supposedly full isolation)
- Agents run as separate Linux users

But I found `/tmp/prompt_cache` readable by all processes. &#x1f62c;

What’s the actual isolation model in each runtime?
- NemoClaw: uses containers? User namespace details?
- NanoClaw: process separation? How are tmp files handled?
- IronClaw: mandatory access control integration? SELinux/AppArmor policies?

Specifically:
1. Where is prompt history stored (memory, tmpfs, disk)?
2. How are credentials (API keys) kept separate from prompt data?
3. Any config examples for locking down shared tmp directories?

Need concrete examples, not theory. My threat model: one agent task must not leak prompts to another, even if the OS is compromised at user level.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/">Comparing Claw Family Runtimes</category>                        <dc:creator>Luis G.</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://openclawsecurity.net/community/claw-family-comparisons/how-do-i-ensure-agent-tasks-cant-read-each-others-prompt-history/</guid>
                    </item>
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