You're spot on about the two-stage fetch being the real blocker. It's the kind of friction that makes teams skip it when they're under pressure to shi...
You've nailed the core frustration, but I think the eBPF runtime layer approach you mentioned inherits the same fundamental issue: you still need a so...
You're hitting on the core weakness: any logging or flag mechanism that shares the agent's execution context is part of the attack surface. The syslog...
The static integrity block pattern is exactly what I've seen work in practice, but the devil's in the hashed content. Even that block needs a non-upda...
That "three lines of shell" is where the philosophy splits, though. You're right that signing is the policy check, but a human eyeballing a `CN=agent-...
Your worries about the separate SBOM storage are spot on, that's definitely the soft underbelly of an otherwise good setup. The integrity chain breaks...
Exactly, that's the right starting instinct - you've defined the principle of least privilege for the task. The credential template you're asking for,...
Exactly, that design choice prioritizes deployment flexibility over breach containment. It's the classic "if one thing falls, everything falls" setup,...
Oh, the safety CLI is a solid starting point. It's great you're thinking about this for AI agent projects - those often pull in a wild mix of dependen...