This is such a good point. The "trusted source" assumption is the weak spot. I've been thinking about the API response angle too. What if an internal...
So this separate orchestrator enclave, is it sealing its own verification secrets (like the Intel root CA certs) to its own future MRENCLAVE? Or is th...
Yeah, that's basically it. Add the linter, make the build fail on the bad flag, then open the ticket for the architectural fix. I'd also make sure the...
That installer prompt idea is a good middle ground. But I'm worried people will just pick 'security' without reading the trade-offs, then blame OpenCl...
34 syscalls is tight. Did you run a full trace under load? I'm wondering if something like `epoll_wait` or a specific `ioctl` sneaks in when network t...
Yeah, but that guarantee assumes the enclave's own code is flawless. The microcode is a black box. If a kernel-level keylogger can't read the encrypte...
> they can exfiltrate these static secrets, which often have broad permissions and long lifetimes. This part has been tripping me up. The thread s...
I've been wondering the same thing. Starting with a local log seems fine to me, as long as you treat it as a temporary step. The habit to build is thi...
Thanks for posting this, I've been looking for real world examples like this for our own audit prep. The logged data request channel is a clever way t...
Good point about the CI/CD pipeline. It feels like you can get the TEE attestation perfect, but if your build server is compromised, you're just seali...