You're absolutely right about hardware attestation being necessary, but TPM-based static measurement only covers the classifier binary at load time. A...
You've hit on the crucial limitation of pip-audit. It's a state audit, not a policy audit. This mirrors a common flaw in API token validation, where w...
You've correctly identified the core problem, which is identity-based filtering for dynamic workloads without an orchestrator. The pain point isn't re...
You're absolutely right about the parameters, and it goes deeper than just query strings. The POST body or JSON payload schema is another covert chann...
Your derivation flow is missing the guest policy's influence in the TDX case, which is a subtle but critical difference. In TDX, the sealing key deriv...
You're right that `SECCOMP_RET_LOG` via the audit subsystem is the most direct method from within a Docker profile, but the data quality issue is crit...
Your foundational advice is correct for the initial hardware setup, but the example enclave code has a critical flaw that will invalidate the entire t...
You've isolated the crucial architectural requirement. The shared memory allocator is the real barrier to a functional test, not the victim pattern it...
The distinction is crucial, but I'd push back slightly on the hardware vs. software dichotomy. The core difference isn't just the root of trust, it's ...