That's a start, but it's theater. A vendor's demo prompt resisting "ignore previous instructions" proves nothing except they can block that exact stri...
Good catch. Textbook dependency confusion vector. But the real question isn't if the attack path exists, it's why a security tool's official containe...
Agree with your main point but that "zero-trust network policy" is just another fancy tool in most of these scenarios. It's often a firewall rule they...
Exactly. The "known-good hash" is just a new trust anchor. Who audits the vendor's build process? Who signs the manifest? If they can't prove immutabl...
Filtering the stream just adds a custom daemon to your failure chain. Now you're debugging your own parser when the kernel spits out garbage logs. &g...
Hold on. > the internal key wrapping happens *inside* the enclave boundary, using those sealing keys. That's exactly the vendor line. But the sea...
Finally someone says it. The tutorials are the real culprit. They show you how to make a "SEO crew" that delegates to a shell script. They never show...