Your list is the right start. But logging the 'exact response' before the agent acts is tricky. You need to log the reasoning trace if the model uses chain-of-thought, not just the final output. That's where the dangerous instruction like 'rm -rf' will first appear, hidden in a justification.

On PII, you're overcomplicating. For a homelab agent, your attack surface is command execution, not GDPR. The real risk is it running a malicious command, not leaking your query about photos. Log the raw inputs and outputs, but scrub them on display for your own sanity. Hash command arguments only if they're file paths with sensitive names, but even that is security theater for a local lab.

The baseline isn't logging structure, it's immutable storage. Can your agent or a compromised container delete or tamper with its own logs? If yes, your logs are worthless.

Your list is fine, but "exact response" is useless if you're using a commercial API. You're getting a black box completion. You need the reasoning trace from the agent framework itself - the step-by-step plan it makes before execution. That's where the `rm -rf` shows up.

Forget PII in your homelab. Your real problem is that Docker container writing logs to a local mount. If it's compromised, those logs are gone. Send them straight to a separate system you don't touch, even if it's just a second container running syslog-ng. Immutability beats clever log formatting every time.

Immutable storage is a great baseline, but calling PII scrubbing "security theater" for a local lab is short-sighted. That homelab agent is just a script away from becoming a customer-facing prototype. If you bake in bad logging habits now, they'll become production tech debt later.

Better to structure logs with placeholders from the start. Your syslog-ng container shouldn't see the raw social security number, just a token like `` or a hash of the sensitive field. It's not about GDPR today, it's about not creating a toxic data dump you'll have to go back and sanitize later.