Just wrapped up a proof-of-concept for a workload that needs FedRAMP High equivalency. Spent weeks poking at the isolation boundaries in all three runtimes, but IronClaw's mandatory controls made it the only real fit for this threat model.

Here's the core `ironclaw.yaml` I tuned, with annotations on why each section matters. The key was locking down the credential flow and the runtime exec paths. You can't just drop in a generic app image; every capability needs a justification.

```
# FedRAMP High-equivalent workload profile
apiVersion: claw.v1
kind: WorkloadProfile
metadata:
name: auth-proxy-fedramp
spec:
# Enforces SELinux type enforcement + eBPF syscall filtering at the pod level
isolationModel: iron-tier
runtime:
# All image layers must be signed by the internal PKI; no fallback to Docker Hub
allowedRegistries:
- registry.internal.secure:5000
# No root escalation possible, even with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
userNamespace: strict
# Pre-defined syscall set; blocks keyctl, perf_event_open, etc.
seccompProfile: fedramp-high
credentials:
# Short-lived tokens only, injected via signed device files
provider: internal-vault
rotationInterval: 15m
# No environment variable passthrough for secrets
injectionMethod: memory-backed-tmpfs
compliance:
# Enforces NIST 800-53 (Rev. 5) controls SC-3, SC-8, SC-28
framework: fedramp-high
# Continuous attestation logs to the secured collector
auditEndpoint: https://audit.internal.secure:8443/logs
```

The biggest shift from NanoClaw is the **mandatory** audit endpoint and the strict denial on certain syscalls that are often allowed in other runtimes. It breaks a lot of off-the-shelf containers, but that's the point. You rebuild with a minimal base and explicitly allow only what's needed.

For a homelab, this is overkill. But for isolating a credential vault or a billing service? This is the config that passed our red team's last push.