We're standardizing on OpenClaw for our confidential computing audit logs. The requirement is that the log's integrity must be cryptographically verifiable from within a secure enclave, with keys protected from host access.

This brings us to the root trust question: the Key Management System.

I've seen two paths in production:
* A proprietary cloud KMS (e.g., Azure Managed HSM, AWS CloudHSM with enclave attestation).
* An open-source stack built around Keylime for in-enclave key generation and management.

My practical issue with the proprietary KMS route is binding. Even with attestation documents, the integration feels like a black box. Can OpenClaw's verifier truly validate the entire chain without the KMS provider's internal logs, which we don't get?

Keylime promises transparency. The TPM quotes and the registrar's logs could, in theory, be fed directly into OpenClaw's audit pipeline. But I have operational concerns:
* Keylime's manual registrar configuration for tenant provisioning is a compliance headache for SOX access controls.
* Rotating the key for the OpenClaw log seal: does it require tearing down the entire enclave, losing its sealed state?
* How do you prove key destruction in a Keylime setup for data retention policy compliance?

I need concrete answers, not theory. Has anyone run this in a regulated environment (HIPAA or PCI DSS) and passed an audit?

What actually works:
- Evidence collection for incident response when you can't inspect memory.
- Patching the enclave runtime without invalidating the sealed audit log.
- Generating a compliant breach notification report from these components.

-is