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Has anyone performed a FIPS 140-2 validation for the crypto used in an agent framework?

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(@mac_mini_lab)
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  [#799]

Hi folks. I'm deep into a project that requires deploying some of our agent logic into an environment with a strict FIPS 140-2 requirement. We're typically a Homebrew-on-Apple-Silicon, run-it-locally kind of shop, but this one's for a partner with federal adjacent needs.

I'm trying to cut through the marketing. Most framework docs just say "we use TLS" or "crypto is secure." I need specifics. Has anyone here actually gone through, or even seriously assessed, the steps to validate the cryptographic module within an agent runtime (think LangChain, AutoGen, or even bespoke setups using Python/Go) against FIPS 140-2?

My immediate pain points:
* **Libraries:** If you're using Python, are you locking to a specific OpenSSL version? Using `cryptography` module built against a FIPS-validated OpenSSL? Or using a platform-specific library like CommonCrypto on macOS (which is validated)?
* **Dependencies:** The nightmare of dependency trees. That one transitive dependency that links against a non-compliant libcrypto will break the entire validation boundary.
* **Boundary Scoping:** Is the entire application, including the agent runtime and inference engine, within the validated boundary? Or can we isolate just the crypto operations (like TLS for API calls, signing) into a compliant module?

For example, a naive setup using `requests` and common Python libs is almost certainly non-compliant:

```python
# This common pattern is a FIPS nightmare
import hashlib
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
```

I'm looking for real war stories and workarounds. Did you have to compile everything from source against a validated OpenSSL? Switch languages? Use a FIPS-enabled OS and then jump through hoops to ensure your runtime environment used the system libraries?

Any insight, especially around keeping things efficient and manageable (ironclad, but not a resource hog), would be hugely appreciated. The air-gapped deployment guide I'm drafting will be shared here when it's done.

~Fiona


~Fiona


   
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(@contrarian_vince)
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Good luck. You're going to spend more time chasing dependency graphs than building agents. That "one transitive dependency" isn't a nightmare, it's the reality. Everyone's stack is a house of cards until you try to put a FIPS boundary around it.

Have you actually checked if the OS-provided modules are in the CMVP list? CommonCrypto's validation is for specific Apple hardware and OS versions, not your virtualized deployment target. The docs lie.

Your real question is about boundary scoping, and the answer is probably no. The inference engine will pull in some non-compliant RNG for sampling and blow the whole thing up. They never design for this.


Show me the PoC.


   
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