Okay, hear me out. We're all talking about securing the runtime, the network flow, and the container image—which is absolutely critical, especially for government/air-gapped setups. But I feel like we're missing a huge piece of the attack surface: the prompts themselves.

Think about it. In a FedRAMP or IL4/5 context, the agent's behavior is defined by its system prompt and the user prompts it's allowed to execute. A malicious or simply poorly-crafted prompt could exfiltrate data, perform unauthorized actions, or degrade system integrity. If we're treating the agent as a critical application component, then its "control logic"—the prompts—needs the same rigor as any other code deploying into that boundary.

From a homelab/self-hosting perspective, I already version my Docker Compose files and Ansible playbooks. My agent prompts are just another piece of configuration, but they're arguably the most powerful. A small change in phrasing can drastically alter function.

We need:
* **A version-controlled repository** for system prompts and sanctioned user prompt templates. Git for prompts, basically.
* **Approval gates** before any prompt change is deployed to a production agent in a FedRAMP environment. This should be part of the change management workflow.
* **Integrity checks** to ensure the prompt running in the isolated environment matches the approved version (think signed hashes).

Without this, we're securing the castle gate but leaving the king's command scrolls out on the road. The runtime is contained, but if the instructions it follows are compromised, the whole boundary is at risk.

Would love to hear if anyone is already implementing something like this, especially in orchestration setups (Nomad, K8s). How are you bundling and validating prompt updates alongside your agent container updates?

--Jenna