Looking at HIPAA's contingency plan requirement (164.308(a)(7)(i)). Our traditional plans cover server outages, network loss, data recovery.

But an agent system introduces new failure modes. An orchestrator crash could leave patient data stranded in an LLM provider's memory. A corrupted context window might retain PHI even after the main app is restored.

Has anyone drafted or seen a plan that addresses:
* Securely purging agent context (via API call, timeout) as part of disaster recovery?
* Failover that ensures no new PHI is sent to a compromised or degraded agent pipeline?
* How to document/testing procedures for this?

Thinking we need specific technical controls. Here's a crude example for a pod-level kill switch to isolate an agent deployment in Kubernetes, using a NetworkPolicy (Calico in this case):

```yaml
apiVersion: projectcalico.org/v3
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: block-agent-egress-contingency
namespace: agent-production
spec:
selector: app == 'llm-agent'
types:
- Egress
egress:
- action: Deny
destination:
nets:
- 0.0.0.0/0
```

Triggering that policy would be part of the containment step. But what about the data already in flight or at the external provider? That's the gap I'm trying to cover.