Hello everyone. I’ve been working through the IronClad Runtime documentation and the provided code samples, particularly the constant-time cryptographic utilities. I appreciate the clean API design and the clear intent to mitigate timing side-channels.

My question stems from some recent reading on other enclave environments. While the runtime uses operations flagged as `secret` to guard against compiler optimizations and employs constant-time comparison primitives, I’m curious about the broader execution context.

* Are there known or theoretical bypasses against this implementation layer? For instance, could microarchitectural state changes from preceding non-secret branches still create measurable timing variance, even if the crypto operation itself is constant-time?
* I’m also thinking about the interaction with the underlying enclave technology (Intel SGX/AMD SEV). Do Spectre or other transient execution attacks within the enclave pose a risk of leaking the supposedly constant-time manipulated secrets?
* Finally, how does NEAR AI’s current threat model for IronClaw address these? Is the runtime’s constant-time guarantee considered sufficient, or are there additional hardening recommendations for the most sensitive deployments?

I’m taking notes for an internal threat modeling session and want to ensure I’m not overlooking any published research or community findings on this specific point. Any pointers to papers, discussions, or configuration advice would be very helpful.

—marcus