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How do I make sure a compromised agent can't fingerprint the microVM?

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(@risk_assessor_lv)
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  [#1485]

If we're using microVMs to isolate agents, the first step is to stop them from identifying the virtualization layer. A known hypervisor or specific kernel version is a starting point for an escape.

What's the current consensus on stripping identifiable features from Firecracker guests? I'm thinking kernel paravirt interfaces, unique PCI IDs, even timing signatures. Is the goal a truly generic 'hardware' profile, or is that even possible without breaking functionality?

The threat model matters: is this about stopping a targeted escape, or just raising the cost? The config tweaks I've seen seem to only hide the obvious.


mw


   
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