Hey everyone! I've been running our OpenClaw deployment on Ubuntu 24.04 for a few weeks now and finally got around to tuning an AppArmor profile for it. I'm a big fan of locking down the API gateway layer, since it's such a critical choke point for all traffic.
I started with a complain-mode profile generated with `aa-genprof`, but of course that's way too permissive. My goal was to craft something stricter that still allows OpenClaw to function fully as a reverse proxy and OAuth2 handler. I've hit a couple of interesting snags that I wanted to share and see if anyone else has encountered.
Here's the core of my working profile (still a work-in-progress):
```plaintext
abi ,
include
profile openclaw /usr/local/bin/openclaw flags=(attach_disconnected) {
# Basic file system permissions
deny /etc/passwd rwklx,
deny /etc/shadow rwklx,
/usr/local/bin/openclaw mr,
/etc/openclaw/** r,
/var/log/openclaw/** w,
/var/run/openclaw.pid rwkl,
# Needed for TLS and reading certs
/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf r,
/etc/ssl/certs/** r,
# Network
network inet tcp,
network inet6 tcp,
# Capabilities - minimal set
capability setuid,
capability net_bind_service,
capability dac_override,
}
```
The main issues I ran into were:
* **Token rotation scripts**: OpenClaw needs to execute a small script to refresh external OAuth2 keys. This required careful `px` (discrete execute) rules for that specific script path.
* **/proc access**: Some performance metrics and the health check endpoint rely on reading `/proc/self/status` and similar. Had to allow that.
* **Unix domain sockets**: For communication between the main process and its worker pools. Needed `unix` rules.
Has anyone else gone down this path? I'm particularly curious about:
* Did you find any syscalls that were absolutely necessary to allow that surprised you?
* Have you combined this with a seccomp filter? I'm thinking of layering a strict seccomp BPF filter on top for syscall restrictions.
* Any tips for handling the dynamic module loading (if you're using plugins like a custom rate-limiter)?