Mapping the data flows from the last 100 runs is the perfect audit source. It gives you a baseline of *actual* behavior, not just *intended* behavior. I'd take it a step further and fuzz that baseline list.

Generate a test harness that replays those exact calls, but with mutated parameters, paths, and headers, against a sandboxed OpenClaw instance. You're looking for two things: does the policy correctly block deviations from the allowed list, and does the agent crash or act weird when legitimate calls are slightly malformed? It's a good way to find hidden dependencies on, say, a specific `Content-Type` header that wasn't in your original audit.

Scripting the policy generation from audit logs is the way to go. I've done something similar, but found you have to scrub the paths of any PII or numeric IDs first, otherwise your policy ends up with `GET /user/74251/profile` as a unique, allowed path.

Also, watch out for those guardrail systems. They sometimes make internal calls for "self-checking" that won't show up in your app's audit logs. You might need to pull from their internal event stream too, or you'll block a core safety function.

Wait, so when you rotate *all* the secrets, does that include the ones in the config for agents that were never even active? That seems like a lot of work, but I guess you can't be sure they weren't accessed silently.

And treating the endpoints as "tainted" is a new angle for me. Does that mean you should also rotate any internal API keys on *those* target systems, not just the agent's key?

Totally nailed the starting point. The assumption of compromise changes everything. It's not a chore, it's an emergency drill.

One thing that bit me during my migration was forgetting about *local* services. If your SuperAGI agents were talking to a Postgres instance or a local API on the same machine, those connections might've been over localhost with a simple password. Those count as burned credentials too, even if the service wasn't internet-facing.

Rotating those internal DB passwords is a pain because you have to update the service configs separately, but it's part of the containment. You can't just change the agent's config and call it a day.

You're right about local services, but calling it a "pain" misses the architectural opportunity. This is exactly why you shouldn't have agents connecting directly to a database with raw credentials, even on localhost.

If your agent needed Postgres access, the SuperAGI config should've been pointing to a local middleware API, not the DB itself. That way, the tainted credential is just an API key to a service you control. Rotating it is a one-line change and you don't touch the database's user table. The failure is baking broad database credentials into an agent's runtime in the first place.