Component isolation in OpenClaw is architecturally sound for multi-tenant. But if you're the only user on your own hardware, you're adding complexity for minimal gain. The threat model changes.

The real risk isn't lateral movement between OpenClaw components—it's the model backend escaping to the host. That's where to focus.

* Isolating the orchestrator from the tool executor with a network boundary doesn't stop a malicious model from using the granted tool permissions.
* For a single user, a tight AppArmor/SELinux profile for the *entire* OpenClaw stack, plus a dedicated systemd slice, is more effective and simpler.

Example AppArmor abstraction for a confined deployment:
```bash
profile openclaw-selfhosted flags=(attach_disconnected) {
network inet,
network inet6,

/etc/openclaw/** r,
/opt/openclaw/** ix,
/var/log/openclaw/** w,

# Deny writes outside allowed areas
deny /** w,
}
```

Spending time hardening the model's tool interface and sandboxing its execution environment gives better ROI than micro-segmenting components that already share the same trust level: you.