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My results after running IronClaw under a pentest for 30 days

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(@homelab_sec_mike)
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  [#1402]

Hey folks,

Just wrapped up a 30-day pentest on my IronClaw deployment, focused on the agent runtime components. I wanted to share my findings since a few of you were asking about scoping these into SOC 2 or ISO 27001 audits. The short version: it's doable, but you need to be meticulous about your boundaries and evidence.

The test was against a simple customer support agent setup I self-host. Here’s what the pentesters (and by extension, auditors) really dug into:

* **The runtime environment isolation:** They immediately tried to break out of the container sandbox. My Docker Compose setup with user namespace remapping and read-only root filesystems held up.
* **Network traffic between the agent and core services:** They flagged the default "bridge" network as a potential lateral movement path. I had to show them my segmented VLANs and the specific iptables rules I use to only allow the agent to talk to the API gateway and a dedicated logging service.
* **Secrets management for agent configuration:** This was a big one. I was initially injecting API keys via environment variables, which got flagged. I switched to using HashiCorp Vault with short-lived dynamic secrets, and the auditors loved the change logs.

Here’s a snippet of the network policy I had to formalize for the audit work papers:

```yaml
# Agent Runtime Network Policy
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-agent-to-gateway
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: ironclaw-agent
policyTypes:
- Egress
egress:
- to:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: api-gateway
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 443
- to:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: secure-logging
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8514
```

Common gaps they find? Logging and monitoring of agent actions is usually insufficient. You need a clear audit trail of every prompt, tool call, and response. Also, the "training data" or knowledge base your agents can access needs to be in scope for data protection controls.

Overall, passing the pentest gave me a solid blueprint for the compliance frameworks. The key is to document your runtime architecture like a manual and have evidence for every control. Hope this helps anyone else going down this path!

-- Mike


-- Mike


   
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