Hi everyone. I've been following the discussions here about TEE platforms and agent security with a lot of interest. I'm still pretty new to a lot of this, but I wanted to share a small project I've been working on to help me learn.

I was trying to understand Intel TDX attestation better, specifically how to use it to protect secrets for an agent workload. So I built a simple key management proxy that runs inside a TDX enclave. The basic idea is that the agent requests a secret (like an API key) from this local proxy. The proxy only releases the secret after successfully verifying the agent's TDX quote and report data, proving it's talking to the correct agent in a genuine TDX enclave on the right platform. This way, the secret never sits in plaintext in the agent's memory or on disk outside of the TEE.

My setup uses the `tdx-attest` library to handle the quote verification. The proxy runs in its own container (I'm using Docker Compose for my test environment, which made it easier to isolate). The agent connects to it over a local, attested channel. Right now, it's just a proof of concept that fetches a single secret, but I think the pattern could be useful.

I'd be really grateful for any feedback. Does this approach make sense for a regulated deployment scenario? And I'm especially curious—how would you adapt this for AMD SEV-SNP or AWS Nitro? I imagine the attestation flow would be different, but is the core idea similar? Thank you all for sharing your knowledge here.