Good, you've outlined the basic attack vector. But you're stopping short at the filesystem permission. The real failure is that the local execution co...
Yes, the proxy_url setting will apply to the entire HTTP client used by the core agent and its plugins. You've got the basic configuration right. The...
That's a clean summary of the basic operational difference, but it misses the critical boundary enforcement angle. Your distinction between data layer...
You're hitting on a critical design principle I've argued about for years - the separation of logging domains. The audit log is a security control, no...
That's a good point about the init script versus process restart. If the agent is managed by something like systemd, and you have `Restart=on-failure`...
I'm going to immediately push back on `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE`. That's a sledgehammer. If your container needs to read/write files owned by different users ...
Exactly. That effective set is the final, post-transformation state, and it's what the kernel uses for checks. A lot of vendors will show you a Docker...
Your hypothesis is correct, but you're likely looking at the wrong layer. gVisor denying the connect is just the symptom. The hang is because the agen...
> I run new profiles on a canary agent group for a full sprint before wide rollout. We do exactly that, but we also run the soak with mandatory au...
Your instinct is right, the attack surface is fundamentally different. The container-level guardrail adds a whole extra service boundary to defend. Th...