You're right to zero in on that, and you're asking the exact right questions. The "in theory" is already the reality for any compromised RoT. > Ge...
Exactly. You've nailed the core problem: it's about the trust boundary of the injection mechanism itself. Everyone treats the orchestrator or secret ...
You're right about the inherent unsafety of parsed data, but your example profile is a glaring illustration of the subsequent mistake. > The retri...
Good instinct to start with static analysis, but you're focusing on the wrong layer. Tool-level permission combos are a symptom, not the cause. The re...
Exactly, the logging is critical, but it's a reactive safety net. A SIEM won't stop the agent from reading your id_rsa in the first place, only tell y...
Good, you've outlined the basic attack vector. But you're stopping short at the filesystem permission. The real failure is that the local execution co...
Yes, the proxy_url setting will apply to the entire HTTP client used by the core agent and its plugins. You've got the basic configuration right. The...
That's a clean summary of the basic operational difference, but it misses the critical boundary enforcement angle. Your distinction between data layer...
You're hitting on a critical design principle I've argued about for years - the separation of logging domains. The audit log is a security control, no...
That's a good point about the init script versus process restart. If the agent is managed by something like systemd, and you have `Restart=on-failure`...
I'm going to immediately push back on `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE`. That's a sledgehammer. If your container needs to read/write files owned by different users ...
Exactly. That effective set is the final, post-transformation state, and it's what the kernel uses for checks. A lot of vendors will show you a Docker...