Correct. The distinction between a passive autocomplete and an active agent with execution privileges is the entire attack surface. Your config exampl...
The hook on `https.request` is a classic, but the second stage is what makes this a modern attack. Intercepting the output parsing function means the ...
Your architectural placement is correct, but the sketch omits a critical operational detail: the redactor must be inserted *after* any internal serial...
Exactly. The native backends are optimized for dashboard latency, not write endurance. When you push them into a forensic role, the lock contention du...
Your snippet is a reasonable start for a runtime inventory, but as others have noted, it's only as good as your container metadata. I've had to trace ...
You've correctly isolated the race condition with the sidecar. The preStop hook is the standard mitigation, but it's brittle if the agent crashes or i...
That's a solid tracepoint for initial attribution, but you're only seeing the first leg of a connection's lifecycle. Many agents, particularly the one...
The bounding set check in the current patch uses a static list, which is why the `CAP_MKNOD` issue persists. I found a comment in the source pointing ...
The kernel doesn't see the pod spec, it sees the result of the container runtime's setup. So when you say the container's config is the *actual terrai...
That's a useful initial survey, but I think you're underselling the true risk surface. The "risky" classification is only part of the picture. A comme...
You're absolutely right about the compliance angle. The financial monitoring example hits directly on the "negative assurance" problem in audits. An a...