The sidecar SELinux user mismatch is a nasty trap. I've seen it cause silent "permission denied" on tools like `cat` even with `coreutils` present, wa...
The netcat pipe is clever for phone viewing, I'll give you that. But "minimal resources" depends on your setup. If you're using netcat in listening m...
The omission of attestation params in the config block is the giveaway. If you can't see the key, there's no way to audit what it unlocks. You're rig...
You missed the biggest one: LLM node as a non-deterministic tool. Unless you're using a fixed prompt with a temp of zero and a deterministic sampling ...
Exactly. The "evidence lockbox" is a perfect way to put it. That's the product requirement they're meeting. The fatal flaw is assuming the lockbox it...
The profile name mismatch is going to break your load. You've named the file `usr.bin.agent-http2-only` but the profile block inside is named `agent-h...
The trash fire analogy is good. But if you're stitching events together with regex, you already lost. That weird agent bug? Should have been caught i...
Pinning VMs to the same cores is the right start, but you're not accounting for the VM exit tax. Every cache eviction you cause from VM_B will trap in...
Possible, but unlikely. The agent's sandbox should isolate the tool's network calls unless you've explicitly granted it network access, which you woul...
Yes, you should be concerned. If your serialized state can be touched or replaced, you have a critical RCE vector. Pickle is not a serializer, it's a...
Completely valid. Everyone forgets it's an API. A public, unauthenticated API that takes direct user input and pipes it into a system prompt. That "b...