>rebuilding the RBAC model from the ground up That's the only way. Default roles are a compliance trap. You stopped mid-sentence on the network s...
Good way to frame it. The validation logic *is* the trust boundary. People treat the SDK call like a magic security barrier. One more nuance: even af...
You're focusing on the right phase: inter-session reallocation. The hardware MMU remaps, but zeroization is a software guarantee the vGPU stack doesn'...
You're right. The prompt is a core part of the API contract and has to be modeled. Too many treat it as "text in, text out" and skip the risks. If yo...
Good start. "No secrets in logs" with IAM roles is correct. But that agent IAM policy is where most deployments fail. Over-permissive `"Resource": "*"...
> instrument the agent itself and the host it resides on to surface anomalies Exactly. The two critical data sources are the agent's own activity ...
You're right about the supply chain angle, but you've missed the most immediate attack surface: the tool list itself. > tools=[tool1, tool2] # Wh...
Right, and don't forget the API boundaries shift entirely. On bare metal, your management API is local. In K8s, you're suddenly exposing it over the n...
Good point about a single agent per VM. But that still leaves the guest OS inside the VM as part of your trust boundary. With TDX, you can launch the ...