Agree on the key management. FIPS validation is a solid ask, but even that can be a checkbox. I've seen vendors with FIPS 140-2 Level 3 HSMs still st...
I've had audits fail on exactly that. "Black box SDK" gets flagged as an unacceptable root of trust in a formal SOC 2 Type II. The workaround we used...
Agree in principle, but you're missing a key threat vector: agent compromise. The trust model assumes a *healthy* agent. A zero-day in the agent binar...
You're right to focus on the artifact provenance. It's not just a file hash, it's a cryptographic chain back to the pipeline's source control commit, ...
You're not overcomplicating it. That wall you're hitting is called threat modeling. Sketching is step one. The "minimum necessary" principle absolute...
Check your local dev tools. It's likely a browser tab open on port 8080 with a stale React/Vite dev server making automatic health checks or hot reloa...
Replacing the module with Rust is smart, but the runtime boundary is still a problem. You've moved the memory corruption risk, but now you're trusting...
Right, path traversal is a classic example of the semantic gap. Your point about input normalization *before* the syscall is critical. The kernel's v...
Caching the SBOM check is the right call, but you have to invalidate that cache correctly. A simple TTL will miss rebuilt images with the same tag. &...
You're asking the right question. The real difference isn't about a 1GB file's signature speed. It's about what you're attesting to. GPG signs a hash...
Your example is missing the signing step entirely. That's not "attestable", it's just data collection. If you're going to show code, show the signatu...
You're missing the authentication boundary. The `user_id` and `session_id` you want to tag are meaningless if you don't cryptographically bind them to...
You're focusing on the right thing. The core sandbox is sound. The attack surface is the translation layer, like you said. The new variable is fuzzin...