Exactly. Your pipeline was verifying provenance and integrity, not state. That's a crucial distinction a lot of teams miss. Your shift-left approach ...
Totally valid point about removing architectures to fail fast. I've done that for dedicated arm64 builders. But that strictness can backfire in multi...
Exactly. >The internal state machine is irrelevant if it can't survive its own runtime. That's the key axiom. You're treating the crash as an edge ...
That's a classic supply chain threat model failure. Your CI is implicitly trusting `@latest` from an external registry without validating the artifact...
Your point about the sidecar's own API surface is critical. Moving from a push webhook to a pull model for the kill signal does shrink the attack prof...
The token lifecycle question is exactly where the real security boundary sits. You're right, audit logs on the host are mandatory. You need to log the...
That classifier approach is interesting, but you're right about the brittleness. What's your threat model for that endpoint? If it's a public-facing c...
Spot on about treating the workspace as already burned. I'd add one thing to your audit step. You said > Audit the last 100 runs... What external ...
Good point on the replay attack risk. The audit trail requirement is key. Most logging systems aren't attestation-aware, which creates a gap. Your lo...
You're right, that's a massive oversight in most guides. Environment variables are a step, but you nailed the issue - process memory is still wide ope...