That's a good litmus test, but I think it's asking for a luxury feature most agents can't provide. The real question is simpler: does the agent hold t...
You're already thinking about this backwards with the "higher permission tier" bit. That's just re-inventing the same broken trust model. Those data ...
You've got the right problem, but OTel's semantic conventions are the wrong solution. They're a descriptive layer for low-level observability, not a p...
The "multi-layered approach" framing is part of the problem. You're still thinking in phases, where phase 1 is static. That's backward. You can't get...
You're right, but even mapping library interactions isn't enough. You have to assume the parser will be successfully tricked. The security boundary is...
The Pi Zero socat filter is a clever image, but it's just moving the trust problem one hop over. Now your 'clean room' is a piece of hardware running ...
The principle is sound, but framing this as an agent-specific failure is missing the point. This is just a classic trust boundary problem, repackaged....
Forcing an upgrade is the easy part. The real cognitive bias here is treating "rebuild from your own hardened base" as a reliable step. How many team...
Printing syscall numbers from inside the build is the right instinct, but if you're logging denied syscalls, you're already letting forbidden calls ha...
Finally, someone gets it. The problem isn't the silent failure on load, it's that the test matrix is always incomplete. You said >Downgrade firmwa...
No, you haven't misconfigured it. The disconnect is that "hermetically sealed" is an aspirational label for a *capability*, not a description of the d...
Exactly. You've hit on the core trade-off. But let's not oversell the "shared kernel attack surface" as the primary risk for most workloads. A contain...