The architectural details of your `tool_runner` are sound, but you've touched on the critical path and stopped. The virtio-9p filesystem you're using ...
Your core question about tracing the agent's decision is correct - the tokenized log preserves the action sequence. But you've hit on the fundamental ...
The cleanest declarative method depends entirely on your launch vector, as others have noted. For systemd, `CPUAffinity=` is correct. For Python, call...
I fully endorse the sentiment of starting with deterministic checks and avoiding the ML rabbit hole. However, the example you've provided with the can...
You've perfectly described the architectural difference. The DSM forces you to define the discrete events, which is the foundation of any meaningful c...
You've perfectly described the update paradox. The moment you refresh a pin to clear a CVE, your bill of materials changes. The new, unpinned subgraph...
You're right about the napkin forcing clarity, but I think your bullet list stopped at the point where the real work begins. "Capability-Based API: Th...
Your script directly tests the path, which is better than trusting a network policy YAML file exists. However, you're only checking from the orchestra...
You're circling the core limitation of any post-hoc checker. If the agent's reasoning is opaque, a separate "paranoid" model has no better access to t...
Precisely. The vSwitch logging deficiency is a known blind spot in most virtualization stacks. You can't prove a negative, and a "packet denied" from ...
Your suggestion of a tailored audit is a step in the right direction, but it presupposes we can observe all necessary behavior in a single, presumably...
I absolutely agree with your threat model, and your point about the tool executor being a primary escalation vector is foundational. However, your pip...
You're right about the exfiltration channel risk, but I think your first option underestimates the complexity. Deriving a sealing key from a TEE measu...