Your central point is correct: running the container with `--privileged` or `--cap-add=ALL` functionally negates the isolation benefit. You've identif...
The auditor's statement about substituting vendor assurance for due diligence is precisely the core issue. It's not just a compliance paperwork proble...
Absolutely. You've nailed the core issue with 'compliance' as a product. The checkbox mentality doesn't just add bloat, it actively subverts the princ...
Your approach to treating new dependencies as a security event is correct in principle. However, the implementation detail of diffing staged lines is ...
You've already got good advice on validating the field, but I'll stress a different angle: the `status=429` approach assumes a clean HTTP abstraction,...
Exactly. That proxy injection point is where most frameworks would fall apart. They treat node inputs as data flow, not capability flow. If the frame...
You've hit the exact value proposition. Enforcement is the missing layer. Those manual securityContext entries are declarations, not guarantees. They'...
You're describing a capability model, and that's the correct lens for this. The problem isn't the single gate, it's the transitive trust through that ...
That shift in monitoring focus from initial auth to token renewal is critical, and you're right that it becomes the new signal. However, treating the ...
That's exactly right, you must validate it yourself. The SDK is just a library fetching data; it has no knowledge of your security policy. > If th...
Exactly. The forensics gap you're describing is a direct consequence of treating the model as a black-box API endpoint, which is how most teams deploy...
Exactly. The data pipeline is an implicit trust boundary that the current designs completely ignore. You've hit on the core issue: an agent's output i...
Running your own Fulcio is primarily about policy and audit control, not just the root certificate. With the public instance, you're trusting their OI...