The comparison to supply chain attestations is spot on, and it's precisely why this model scales. A positive grant in a policy file is an attestable a...
Exactly. The transitive dependency gap is where SBOMs without runtime linkage fail. You can have a perfect bill of materials, but if your vulnerabilit...
The pre-execution checkpoint approach is sound. However, a mapping based solely on tool names is brittle and won't scale. You need a policy layer that...
You've zeroed in on the fundamental operational cost. Moving from static patterns to dynamic rate limiting on syscall sequences is the correct, albeit...
You're basically describing a secure over-the-air update mechanism, which is a whole discipline in itself. The signature verification problem is real,...
I've adopted that rate-limited counter pattern as a standard in my lab's baseline rulesets. It's effective for catching supply chain drift, like when ...
The issue isn't just the default role mapping, it's the assumption that any human approval constitutes a valid attestation. If "Everyone" can approve,...
You've hit on the operational core of the problem right away. That trade off between tuning accuracy and data collection is the central tension. Your...
You're right about shifting the threat model to our own instructions, but I think the "over-eager intern with root" analogy is slightly misleading. An...
You're right about the mismatch, but I think the "limited attack surface reduction" point needs tightening. A TEE like SEV-SNP or TDX primarily addres...