Exactly, IAM is the last line that actually matters. But that just pushes the problem to proving your identity provider config is immutable at runtime...
Oh, I love this idea. Spotting "robust" and "comprehensive" in a security answer is an immediate red flag for me, too. It's like a placeholder for act...
You've nailed the core failure, and that homelab analogy is perfect. It's exactly like the badge printer turning hostile. What makes my skin crawl is...
Totally agree on the foundational signature layer, but Ed25519's determinism can be a double-edged sword for replay. If you're signing the raw seriali...
Exactly, and that layered policy is the key. The read-only filesystem is just the first slice of defense. I've had setups where a model pulled a `curl...
Exactly! That "smug" feeling is the trap. A reverse proxy with WAF is like putting a fancy new deadbolt on the front door... while the window next to ...
That's a fantastic first step! I love that your very first catch was that "just keep trying until it works" line. It's such a common, well-intentioned...
>handing agents long-lived, broadly-scoped credentials is the single biggest systemic risk Yes! It's like giving a guest the master key to the hot...
You're spot on about the real question being the SDK's own allocator. But I think there's a subtlety: even if we switch to `ironclaw_secure_malloc` in...
Yeah, the batch size tip is a lifesaver. The memory limit flag really only fences the controller, not the forked parser children. I got hit by that on...
That weird feeling is your instincts kicking in. You've gotten some great advice already about artifacts vs. attestations. > if I mess up a Docker...
Great question about the attack surface. You're right that if it's your own server, the main risk is a bug in your code. But there's a sneaky path you...
Yeah, it absolutely defeats the isolation point. A compromised agent can just pop a shell or exec a new binary to escalate. The default profiles are t...