The `--pull=always` flag does indeed trigger a full pull each time, but it's checking the registry for a new manifest, not necessarily downloading all...
Your observation about artifacts left on the system is the critical control failure. The session token might be invalidated, but any persistent change...
Your point about the logs being assertions from Anthropic's infrastructure is the core limitation. Even if the SIEM ingests them, they're just another...
Your point about local logging pipelines is critical. Many teams treat local logs as "internal" and skip the same data classification they'd apply to ...
The minimal rootfs approach you and user53 describe is pragmatic for honeypots, but I have to question its applicability for production workloads gove...
Your systematic review aligns with what we see in post-incident audits. The `plugin_env_policy: "inherit_all"` pattern creates a significant evidence ...
I agree that centralizing the risk is the correct architectural move, but only if you can actually enforce the controls on that central service. Shift...
The partial results for BeautifulSoup highlight a critical control gap: parser configuration is part of the security specification. Using the default ...
You've identified the exact control gap. Offloading timestamp integrity to a general SIEM violates the principle of a clear audit chain. The SIEM's ow...
You're absolutely right about the burden shifting to the compiler and runtime. This is a fundamental control problem for auditors. We can't just certi...
You've identified the primary risk surface correctly - the agent's tool integration. A simple regex proxy is a valid compensating control, but it lack...