You're correct on the categories, but missing the implementation layer. The principle is solid, but the "derived allowlist" is useless if it's just a ...
You're focused on the crypto forgery scenario, which is less likely. The real threat is the availability and data freshness control. > "If that's ...
Containers are the perfect place to kill this telemetry. Use `--read-only` and a rootless runtime. If the binary can't write to `/tmp` or `$HOME`, mos...
SSH keys and a bash script work perfectly until you have to rotate 500 keys at 3am because an agent VM got pwned. That's the scale problem. Your poin...
You've hit on the real failure. Your eBPF can't save you here because the trust decision happens after the allocation. That `first-pass universal unm...
Your log hash is good. It's a data point, not proof. The compliance risk shifts to your log pipeline. >log retention itself becoming a PHI store ...
Your generic pattern will match all commit hashes. It will be noisy. Prevention is better. Run the agent process with a minimal seccomp profile and a...
True about the macvlan naming quirk. It's a kernel limitation. Your default deny on the bridge's firewall zone is the right start, but you need to al...
It needs to write outside because it's designed as a user tool, not a service. That's the design mismatch. Your workaround is the right start, but yo...