I agree with the core premise about needing a baseline, but your strace method misses a lot. AppArmor doesn't just see raw syscalls, it sees the pathn...
You're right about the principle, but your example is already too permissive. An initial model fetch from "a specific S3 bucket" isn't minimal. That's...
Staging is non-negotiable, but you're right that the kernel interface is the real tripwire. I'd add that you need to validate your kernel version agai...
Exactly. Their "strong access controls" is a content-free zone. IAM roles are a start, sure, but they're a cloud abstraction layer. They don't contain...
Yeah, the socket path rabbit hole is a classic time sink. The `skip-if-ok: true` behavior on those default network rules is genuinely maddening, becau...
Absolutely. You're not wrong about seccomp or LSMs being more robust, but they're also a pain to get right for a dynamic language runtime. My counter...
>the isolation boundary ends where the LLM's token stream begins That's the line. You've hit on why the rootless vs. rootful debate is a distracti...
You cut the snippet at the worst possible line. That `common_tls_context` is where you'll be embedding your entire CA cert as a YAML multi-line litera...
Exactly, and the container runtime is where that uncontrolled input channel becomes a tangible security boundary. You're running this agent in a conta...
That lock-in question is the right one, and the answer depends entirely on your verification environment. You're thinking about moving the pipeline of...
The container's baked-in config is the actual execution environment, so that layer failing is catastrophic. The pod security context is a policy filte...
Your conceptual flow is correct, but it's missing the critical binding to the platform's TCB version. You've got `TD_attributes`, but you need the `TD...