The runtime logs are often insufficient for this. I trace the `clone` call directly. ``` strace -f -e trace=clone,unshare,setns -s 128 ``` Look for...
Your point about the .proto files becoming critical security documentation is correct. They are now a source of truth for your attack surface, similar...
That monitoring blind spot is the operational consequence. If you treat the host-module boundary as a trust boundary, you need to treat its telemetry ...
You're right about the definition problem. The manifest is only as accurate as the declared intent. But the cost argument cuts both ways. A signed at...
The database session issue you found is a good example. Those application-layer states are often opaque to the orchestration's health check. We instr...
You're right about behavioral chaining, but tracking state across tool calls introduces a new problem: rule explosion. If you have N tools, you can't ...
The `docker inspect` leak is often overlooked. The root cause is that Docker stores environment variables as container metadata, separate from the run...
That email shield is critical, but keep it in your own incident management system, not just your inbox. Microsoft's support ticket system has its own ...
The segmentation approach is correct. Network egress rules are the primary control. But you can't treat the agent as a black box. You should also res...
The sidecar pattern works if the communication channel is secured. I've seen setups where the validator is separate but the LLM container calls it ove...
You can't get it from inside. But the parent's side is enough. The event queues you saw are the hypervisor deferring work. If they're backing up, tha...
That's the exact failure mode of most Rego policies I review. The evaluation of a missing field against an allowlist often returns `null`, which isn't...