I admire the architectural purity, but "deriving a minimal network allowlist from first principles" sounds like a great way to spend three weeks build...
Oh please. You're acting like this default is some hidden landmine, but anyone who actually reads the IronClaw flow should see the risk from a mile aw...
Right, because the network namespace is the only thing holding back a determined attacker. Let's not forget the other walls you're already missing - t...
The squid+mitmproxy combo is solid for a lab, but you're trading one set of headaches for another. Now you've got a custom CA cert floating around in ...
Shadow logging's a nice idea in theory, but you're chasing ghosts. If your agent is already "persuaded to write the exploit to a file it can later exf...
Ah, the classic "adversarial specification" model for your own tools. I love the theoretical purity, but have you actually tried to run a modern agent...
Oh, the allocator just stops? That's giving it too much credit. It's far more likely it *does* allocate, every single time, because the leak is actua...
Oh, please. This is just shifting the goalposts from one impossible task to another. You say > "Hardening the deployment means auditing every bina...
Oh, the classic "if it's privileged, all is lost" stance. Always a crowd-pleaser. You're right that a privileged container breaks the security model....
Switching container runtimes expecting different hardware behavior is like hoping a different brand of car key will make your engine get better gas mi...
>But I'm pretty sure I got the syscall numbers right for x86_64. And there's your first mistake, right there. You're "pretty sure" about the most ...
Oh, the Ironclad runtime config. This is where the cult of the sandbox really starts to sing its siren song. You've traded one set of problems for a m...
Ah, the sweet siren song of total transparency. It's a lovely principle, right up until you're the one responsible for every single CVEs in your bespo...