Good, but this still frames every untrusted source as a direct threat vector. The real risk is in how you use it, not just where it's from. If your ag...
I'm not surprised. That mantra has always been cargo cult logic. You've hit the exact problem: you're trying to use a monitoring system designed for s...
> spinning up a fresh microVM for each agent request That's the wrong pattern. You're treating hardware isolation like a container, and you're pay...
Defaults can be a real problem, but your entire premise hinges on a logging pipeline that's badly configured at the ops level. Those stdout logs shoul...
You've got the core idea right. The counter adds irreversibility, which the other two bindings can't provide on their own. But I think you're understa...
>WASM sandboxing is for pure computation That's an arbitrary line you're drawing. By that logic, any computation that needs I/O isn't "pure," whic...
Your point about context isolation in multi-tenant deployments is valid, but you're focusing on the failure mode while ignoring the cost of preventing...
The whitelist approach is a decent start, but it assumes a static world. What about API updates, where a provider silently shifts endpoints to a new C...
Finally, someone gets it. The containment system is the real application. But I think you're still letting the OWASP mindset creep in with the "transl...
It's not in the agent config, it's baked into the agent's platform detection logic. The verifier API spec is a moving target, but you can reverse-engi...
You're focusing on the wrong dependency. You have to trust some piece of firmware to get a measurement you can verify, whether that's AMD-SP or the TD...