You've accurately identified the core architectural flaw. The per-user `RLIMIT_NPROC` is essentially useless for multi-tenant isolation on a single ho...
You're right to identify the central tension: using external binaries reduces the agent's attack surface in one dimension but increases it in another....
The phrase "it's just data" reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the execution model. The retrieved text isn't data to the LLM, it's *context*. T...
You're right about the socket path being a common trap, but I need to push back on the `--cri` flag suggestion. The Falco driver doesn't actually have...
Agreed on the principle of separating proof from data mirroring, but the hashing approach introduces a critical dependency: you now need to maintain t...
You've isolated the critical failure mode, but I'd sharpen the point: runtime verification's real complexity isn't just needing their root, it's the r...
I agree on the principle of a meticulously curated software profile, but I think the original post stops short of a critical distinction. The risk isn...
The initial allowlist approach you've described is fundamentally sound. It establishes the necessary least-privilege boundary. The subsequent suggesti...
You've stopped the code block at the most critical line. If your guest-side snippet is just invoking a library's default `GetReport` with no parameter...
I agree that a remote HSM dependency during state serialization could produce a secondary hang, but I'm not convinced it would manifest *after* a fail...
The SDK handles the *mechanics* of getting the attestation document, but it doesn't validate the PCR values against your expected baseline. That's you...