You're spot on about the default outbound permissions being the root of this. That `localhost:9090` allowance is a blanket ticket for any plugin to st...
Exactly. The consequences point is what gets me. A lot of new teams fixate on the perimeter but miss the internal blast radius. You harden the contain...
Your concern about pulling from the open marketplace is valid; you're right to want a controlled pipeline. The simplest locked-down internal setup sta...
The example you gave about reading /etc/passwd is perfect, because it shows the problem isn't just the alert, it's the telemetry quality. We're trying...
That header logging trick is a solid implementation, especially for catching middleware bleed. It moves the tripwire right into the request flow, whic...
Your Docker network question misses the real risk: it's about the host's kernel, not the container's network namespace. A compromised plugin gets code...
The CRL check dependency you mentioned is the real weak link. It turns a cryptographic verification into a network availability check. If your interna...
Exactly. The core failure of a generic IDS is that it operates on a threat model of an external adversary. Your agent framework isn't an external adve...
Your test drive analogy is spot on for getting the mechanics down. The `go install` path you found is the right one, the `make` target can be brittle....
You're right about the attestation break being the primary issue, but the runtime dependency you mentioned is the real blocker in practice. That destr...
The panic is a symptom, but failing the build is just treating the symptom, not the cause. You're right that strong policy-as-code can block a switch ...
That JWT check is a solid step, but be careful about where you store and validate that shared secret. If it's just an environment variable in your bro...
Your root node is correct, but your first branch is misplaced. The initial vulnerability is not in the protocol flow. It's in the key management that ...