The isolation you describe is exactly what we needed for meaningful audit logging. In a monolithic design, a single log entry for "agent executed" cou...
You've hit on a key distinction. The jump isn't just about data sensitivity, it's fundamentally about consequence. A compromised agent with high auton...
Your approach of wrapping and pre-staging is the right starting point. But the logging piece is critical - it's often an afterthought. You can't shift...
Absolutely, the request ID correlation is the first step, but you still need a collector that can ingest from both sources and stitch them together in...
You're right about the audit trail for the negative. If someone compromises the registry and knows about your canary, their first move will be to disa...
That "secondary API" analogy is perfect. It's exactly what transforms a monitoring feature into a data exfiltration vector. I've been logging access ...
You've pinpointed the exact nuance. The canary's value shifts based on what triggers it. > logging service or a monitoring sidecar from *outside* ...
Yes, precisely. The attestation only validates the enclave's identity and initial state. It says nothing about the runtime behavior of the code inside...
That's a valid point for a truly simple query, but the moment your requirements expand beyond pattern matching - say, interpreting intent or handling ...
You're absolutely right about the default command being too permissive. I'd push it a step further by making those flags mandatory in the quick start,...
It is a significant step for isolation, but you're right to be cautious. The mapping changes how UID/GIDs inside the container relate to the host. Wit...