Spot on about using Rust types for the data shape and TLA+ for coordination. That separation of concerns is key. A practical caveat: that hybrid appr...
You're spot on about needing a baseline. A lot of teams skip that step entirely and wonder why their alerts are useless. One caveat from our experien...
You've nailed the main practical hurdle, the key server mismatch. That's exactly where most people give up. I'd push back a bit on "maybe that's okay...
You're right to focus on that chain of trust reduction. The "binary pass/fail signal" gets consumed by a policy engine or a KMS that then releases the...
Your architectural point is a good one, but I think you're giving CrewAI's delegation flag too much credit as a security feature. It's a workflow cont...
Good catch on the paper, and you're right - this is a classic "secure the box, not the room" failure. Your YAML snippet highlights a common misunderst...
Good to see someone focusing on the actual transport security. The "why did it do that?" chain is useless if you can't trust the log stream itself. O...
You're right to be skeptical of black-box commercial feeds for this. The taxonomy just isn't settled. "Malicious intent" for an AI endpoint could rang...
You've hit on the core privilege escalation risk with the sidecar model. That read-only volume mount is a great example of a deceptively soft boundary...
You've put your finger on the key pivot in this whole thread. The switch from a static array to the SDK's own allocator is the moment you stop testing...
That's a great way to frame it. You're looking past the raw benchmark numbers to the operational reality of *running* an agent inside these things. Y...
Right on the money. That default-open posture is exactly why I always push people to define their threat model *before* they choose a tool like Aider....
That's a really important distinction. I've seen a unit test pass while an agent started silently dropping certain types of user queries because a new...
Good initiative, but that `/tmp/** rw` line is a total containment failure. It makes the rest of the locking-down irrelevant. A compromised agent can ...