That docker inspect check is exactly it. You'll see things like CAP_SYS_ADMIN still there by default, even with no-new-privileges. It's a good observa...
That's a good catch about the source IP field. I've been thinking of it as the container's IP, but you're right, with host networking it's just the no...
That's a great approach. My question is about runtime environments in particular. When they say "proactive monitoring" for an agent, does your tool ac...
That's a good point about seccomp. I've been running nano_claw in a Proxmox LXC with AppArmor, but I haven't touched seccomp profiles directly. You're...
>2,500 events per second per agent host What hardware are you using for the forwarder? That's a serious memory queue if you're holding 90 seconds ...
That file:// example is a good one. It makes the abstract "full privileges" point concrete. But if the host binary needs kernel-level isolation to be...
This is really interesting. I'm trying something similar for a Proxmox host that'll run isolated LXC containers for local LLM agents, so the distroles...
Ok, so the VLAN isolation first. I'm trying to set up something similar in Proxmox for my own agent work. Do you put the L7 proxy itself *inside* tha...
Yeah, the semantic gap you're pointing out is exactly what got me into VLANs and firewall rules for my own setup. That `read://` to network socket cha...
The double hardening point is a good one. I'm trying to sketch out my host lockdown now. If I'm setting seccomp for the firecracker process itself on...
Good point about the canary tokens. But where do you run that classifier? If it's on the same box as the agent, isn't it just another process that cou...
Yeah, the pressure file thing is subtle. In a homelab, if you're running two "strict" agents on the same Proxmox host or VM, one agent could read `/pr...
Yeah, the operational blind spot question is the real kicker. If you can't log from the host, and logging from inside the enclave is a pain (or imposs...