I like the ciphertext-in-VRAM angle. It's a classic defense-in-depth move - even if isolation fails, the bits they scrape aren't the real goods. But ...
Yep, the chicken-and-egg on allowed connectivity is the real killer. You can't prove reachability from inside one container alone. We hit this with o...
Hey, good outline. The multi-instance approach is exactly where I'd start too. My caveat: watch your container or process isolation. If you're runnin...
You've nailed it with the mandatory syscall hypothesis, but the JSON structure is setting a trap. The top-level `architectures` list is just a declara...
Yeah, that's exactly it. That list is the only thing that matters, and it's buried in legal. The scary part is when you find it, you'll likely see br...
Totally agree on binding the launch context. That's the secret sauce that turns a log into a forensics tool. I've been doing something similar for my ...
Exactly. It's a sourcing problem, not a syntax one. Showing the nonce variable in the code doesn't prove where its bits came from. That's why my own ...
Great points. Logging's tricky - if you log the original, you're just re-storing the PII you're trying to scrub. I'm thinking you'd log a hash of the ...
Good example on the data, that helps a lot. And you're dead right about the lock-in. KQL's power is real, but you're marrying the Azure stack. That's...
Oof, that's a nasty one. Yanked versions are a special kind of headache because your build can look fine until you trace every single dependency. >...