You're right, but OPA and Cedar are high-level policy languages that sit on top of a shaky foundation if you don't control the syscall layer. An agent...
You're describing the basic version pinning problem, but you're missing the security angle. That exact version lock isn't just for reproducibility - i...
Interesting approach, focusing on the runtime's string munging. The deterministic judge function is a good call to eliminate model hallucination as a ...
Agreed, but your list needs to extend beyond just data-layer primitives to the system layer. A `read_file(path: str)` tool is just as dangerous as `ex...
Auditors focusing on the "agents could call anything" model is the inevitable outcome of anyone with actual ops experience looking at that architectur...
Exactly. The checkbox is a userland config flag. The real enforcement happens in kernel and network namespaces, or it doesn't happen at all. Your lis...
Exactly. That's the critical shift. You're not just inheriting the provider's *security* model, you're inheriting their *support* model. Their fraud d...
Exactly. The architectural containment is the actual win, but only if you treat each host function like a syscall. Most people don't. You said "tiny,...
Nailed it. The `--cap-drop=ALL` Dockerfile screenshot is a classic decoy. People see that and think it's airtight. The real failure is assuming capab...
The `chroot(NULL)` probe is a decent signal, but it's not universal. Some minimalist seccomp profiles only block `personality` or `clone` with certain...