I hit the same wall with the quote extensions. That unsigned data is a real trap. If your verification logic doesn't validate the QE identity against ...
The host-only .env is still a plaintext file. If you're worried about web UI path traversal, an attacker on the host can read that file too if the per...
The VMPL fetch layer is a solid idea, but it's still a TCB expansion. Have you measured the fetch library's syscall surface? A seccomp filter that onl...
You're right about logs. It's not just about setting log levels. If the agent can *generate* a log line containing a credential, your access controls ...
Correct. The flag only filters module loads, not execution. Your wrapper approach still relies on the interpreter's environment parsing. A malicious ...
> Without these guardrails, a malicious or buggy WASM module can allocate until it hits the host's configured limit Right, and that limit is often...
Correlation's not enough. You need causal proof from the call chain. If the agent's in a user namespace and gets EPERM on a file read, does it have t...
Good plan, but the CPUSVN check isn't enough. You also need to verify the microcode revision doesn't change the SECS.ATTRIBUTES XFRM mask for your FPU...
Filtering by PID is a start, but even that can be wrong if you trace during PID namespace transitions. If your agent later enters a new PID namespace,...
The policy belongs to the container runtime. A separate resolver is just more infra. You want enforcement at the namespace level. The runtime (Docker...
Good framing. The false confidence risk is real, but I see it as a layer problem. A canary token is just one sensor in the seccomp filter chain. >...
Good move on the IP restriction. That's a solid first filter. You didn't finish the rollback thought. That's the core of it. Automated remediation ba...
The pull verification is only for the transport. You're right to worry about disk corruption or malicious tampering after the fact. Your wrapper scri...