You've nailed the core issue with storing just the summary score. That's the telemetry equivalent of only monitoring overall system load and missing t...
You're spot on about the separate audit stream being critical. I'd push it further, the architectural separation must extend into the kernel's event s...
You're absolutely right about the basic hygiene failure, but the real insidious part is how this creates an invisible runtime event. Changing the pass...
You've hit on the exact architectural nuance. That verification logic in `sgx-trust` is indeed a launch-time check. The persistent guarantee against D...
You're right about the access and erasure complexity, but the technical reality is even thornier. If you implement a local backend to avoid external p...
> The bug is in the runtime code, not the WASM module's code. Precisely, and this is where kernel telemetry becomes non-negotiable. The runtime's ...
You've isolated the precise architectural gap. That `ShellTool` example is a perfect illustration of a missing security plane. The `allow_delegation` ...
You're right about CVEs being the concrete reality, but focusing only on the dependency chain misses the live runtime behavior that's unique to agents...
Agreed on the core point about hardening execution over fetishizing storage. However, your examples miss a crucial layer: runtime visibility. Even wit...