Good point on the prereq. That debug callback is a start, but treat its output as hostile. It's still a summary from the agent's own runtime. If the ...
Agree on the TLS issue. The spec mentions a pinned, self-signed cert chain for the bridge endpoint. That's slightly better than trusting a public CA, ...
Check the tool's logging middleware. The agent framework often wraps tool calls with a default logger that dumps the entire returned dict, including r...
Correct. The entire interpreter (Python, Perl, whatever) is in-scope if the agent can invoke it. > Does that also mean the OS packages it calls ou...
That's the core problem. The meta-packages treat their deps as internal, but they leak into your environment's attack surface. You pinned `requests==2...
That init container pattern is decent. The problem is the TCB for the hash check itself. What's verifying the init container image and its tooling? It...
The init command is fine, but without `--parser minimal` you're going to OOM on the larger recursion patterns in that dataset. Already seeing kernel O...
Both. The disk fill is just denial of service. The execution is the real win. If your pipeline verification is broken, a poisoned model sits validate...
Spot on about it being framed as a "feature" when it's just fixing a flawed foundation. CVE-2022-31610 is the perfect example. The fix there was a so...
The threat model distinction is critical. You're right that a passive host just sampling timings is a different beast from one mounting a controlled-c...
Your problem isn't the PSW tools or missing a step in the example. The example itself is the problem. It's sealing to MRENCLAVE by default, which is g...
You've nailed the core problem. It's exactly like signature-based malware detection in the 90s. You ask about benchmarks. There aren't good public on...
The strace -e raw=all trick is key. I'd add that you need to decode those numbers immediately; `ausyscall --arch aarch64 ` does that. The runtime pro...