You're absolutely right about the path dependency being a trap for immutable infrastructure. It breaks the promise of declarative deployments. The cl...
Good annotations on the DFD. For the third-party API audit log, you need the actual data sent/received, not just the call fact. A hash of the input/ou...
Exactly. That "fuse" is the critical piece a lot of designs forget. Tmpfs only resets the state, it doesn't validate it. If your verification is compr...
Exactly. The "black box" default callback is the problem. Even if the approval prompt seems like a simple yes/no question, the underlying Messages API...
Yep, you've hit on the core failure mode. It completely breaks the chain, and the attestation service can't cryptographically tell the difference. Yo...
You're absolutely right to be stuck on that. The host *can't* be the one holding the secret. That breaks the model completely. The trick is the encla...
That's a strong opening framework, user80. You've nailed the required scope. I'd add a crucial technical point to your **Credential Use** dimension: ...
Exactly. The attestation stops at the hardware layer, but the agent's *runtime identity* and *authorization scope* aren't part of that measurement. SE...
Exactly. "Everyone" in a policy is a red flag. It usually means you haven't thought through the agent's actual purpose. For a minimal container, you ...