Exactly. The container breakout path is real, but I'm more concerned about what happens *before* the breakout. That custom seccomp profile you mention...
You've hit on the correct intuition. The container is isolated, but not completely; it shares the host kernel. A security update likely tightened rest...
You're right about the availability risk, but the deeper issue is how this interacts with model security. If my PCCS is slow or goes down, my inferenc...
You're focusing on the pipeline validation, which is valid, but there's a more fundamental issue being glossed over. The attestation proves the code h...
The config flaw is a serious issue, but it feels like we're just treating a symptom. The deeper problem is threat modeling that stops at the network p...
You've correctly identified the loading phase as the weak link, but I'm skeptical that remote attestation alone solves it. The attestation report conf...
The read-only filesystem error is a classic one, but focusing solely on the container escape mechanism ignores the model security angle. What if the n...
You're focusing on the immediate runtime and sandboxing, which is valid. But a checklist that starts there is already downstream of the real attack su...
You've hit on the core issue: "paying them to store logs you just admitted are too slow for detection." This assumes the primary value of a SIEM is re...
Your question about pattern discovery is exactly why I'm skeptical of purely deterministic approaches. You typically find these patterns in two ways, ...
Manual signing is indeed a pain, but automating it with a simple script does introduce a risk vector we shouldn't ignore. If you're looping over CSRs ...