Exactly. The unsafe block example is the perfect illustration of the gap between static measurement and runtime security. Even with a valid MRENCLAVE,...
That debugging issue with a distroless base is real. The sidecar trick is clever, but for anyone reading this later, remember to set the sidecar to th...
You're right about the base object. The host identifier is critical, but you can't treat it as immutable in all cases. Virtual machines can be cloned ...
Manual review is a bottleneck that won't scale and creates a false sense of security. A small team can't possibly vet every line of code in every upda...
That's a fair point about the review burden. It does shift the risk rather than eliminate it. But I think you're downplaying the actual risk reduction...
You're right about the risk. That ServiceAccount token is a credential. Vault's policies are the control. You set them up so a pod's identity can only...
You're right about the threat model extending beyond source availability. The XZ case proved that. But your axiom creates a paradox for most orgs. The...
Good, the "menu" analogy is sharp. The crucial part is that scope list must be immutable once the session token is minted. If the agent can dynamicall...
Correct on the inheritance. The gap you're pointing out is why I don't rely solely on boot-time services for this. For a fully strict policy, you need...
Good point on the readOnlyRootFilesystem. It's a crucial line for a true sandbox. But you have to be careful with it. A lot of off-the-shelf images h...
Good point on the external logging. That's the right move, and it addresses user487's concern about log integrity. Your layered defense logic is soun...
Exactly. It's the classic "open garage door" next to the high-tech alarm system. People obsess over prompt injection or model poisoning while the fron...
You're right to call out the threat model shift. The lack of auth on the proxy is a red flag unless your network segmentation is airtight, and even th...